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THE DEVELOPMENT OF
POLITICAL IDEAS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL IDEAS

by

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Revised and enlarged edition

THOMAS NELSON & SONS LTD
LONDON EDINBURGH PARIS MELBOURNE
TORONTO AND NEW YORK

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35-36 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON, E.C.4 ; PARKSIDE
WORKS, EDINBURGH ; 25 RUE DENTERT-ROCHEREAU,
PARIS ; 312 FLINDERS STREET, MELBOURNE ;
91-93 WELLINGTON STREET WEST, TORONTO ;
381-385 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK.

First published, June 1927
Reprinted, 1927, 1928, 1931
New edition for this series,
revised and reset throughout
and brought up to date,
February 1937
Reprinted, May 1937

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL IDEAS

CHAPTER I

GREECE

§ 1. *The Dawn of Political Philosophy*

So far as we know, and so far as we are likely to know, political philosophy in its pure and systematic form had its rise in Ancient Greece during the fifth century before the Christian Era. This statement, of course, does not mean that at no earlier age and in no other region had thinkers ever speculated concerning such subjects as the source of communal authority, the nature of law, or the functions of government. It is extremely probable, although evidence is lacking, that in the immemorial monarchies of Egypt, Babylonia, Asia Minor, and Crete many questions had been asked and many assertions

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made concerning the rights of rulers and the duties of subjects. It is certain that in India and in China much meditation on matters political had taken place, for we have the records of its results embodied for us in many passages widely scattered through the endless volumes of the sacred books of the East. The fact, however, that the political philosophy of the ancient Orient has to be laboriously extracted from the enormous mass of the Oriental mythology sufficiently shows that it was not either pure or systematic. The early monarchies of the world were, indeed, theocracies. The Egyptian Pharaoh was regarded as a God; the great King of Babylonia as the descendant of the Deity: and even the rulers of the Hebrews as "the Lord's anointed," deriving their authority from heaven and sharing it with priests. Hence religion and politics were inextricably bound together; sociology in all its branches was treated as a department of theology.

The Greeks were the first of all recorded peoples to emancipate themselves from the fetters of mythology, to separate science from superstition, boldly to face reality, and endeavour to see things as they actually were. Their most striking characteristic was their secularity. Not

that they disbelieved in deities and dæmons. They recognized an innumerable multitude of them ; so much so that it was said of Athens that in that city it was easier to find a god than a man ; so much so, indeed, that St. Paul, in the early days of Christianity, was impressed by the unusual religiousness of the Athenian dilettantes. But the Greeks did not take their religion too seriously. They euhemerized their divinities, treated them as little more, and not a whit better, than men ; regarded their temples as mere embassies, and the organization of worship as a function of the Foreign Office. Hence in Greece religion and politics were related in a manner unknown elsewhere. Politics was dominant, and religion was its handmaid.

It must be confessed, however, that the emancipation of politics from religion did not at first, in the realm of speculation, produce very happy results. For the escape of the earliest philosophers—viz. Pythagoras (c. 500 B.C.) and his disciples—was merely from mythology into mathematics—from the frying-pan into the fire. Pythagoras defined political justice as a number, a number multiplied by itself, a square number symbolizing harmony, symmetry, equality. Even Plato remained so far in bondage to

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Pythagorean mathematics as to regard the difference between a king and a tyrant as adequately represented by the abstract number 729 ! This way lay lunacy. One is reminded of the protracted calculations of latter-day millenarians respecting the Number of the Beast.

Pythagoras, however, was, after all, a mere natural philosopher and not a political thinker. Like many other men of science of his own and later times, when he left his own special sphere of research he rapidly sank into absurdity. The first professed political philosophers were the Sophists, who flourished in Athens during the fifth century B.C. They were the *intelligentsia* of their day, priding themselves on their complete emancipation from traditional religion and conventional morality, repudiating the claims of patriotism and citizenship, urging the right of the individual to unfettered freedom and full self-expression. They anticipated Machiavelli, Hegel, and Treitschke in their entire separation of public politics from private ethics. They taught the conventional and contractual origin of the State ; they regarded the law as the mere expression of superior force, wholly devoid of any sanctity or binding obligation ; they identified right with might, exalted the non-

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moral superman, and propounded a creed of conduct not unlike that of the modern utilitarians. The practical consequence of their doctrines tended to be serious. For they ran counter to all the ideas which were inherent and implicit in the Greek City-State in which they lived. Hence their subversive dogmas called into the field of political controversy a conservative thinker incomparably more profound and masterly than themselves. This was the ever-memorable Socrates (469-399 B.C.), who, by means of his inimitable dialectic, exposed the falsity of their theories, revealed the fallacies of their arguments, and made manifest the pernicious consequences of their principles of action. Indirectly, and by way of contrast to the doctrines of the Sophists, he taught that the State is natural and inevitable, that law is sacred and immutable, that might is subject to an eternal right, that the community is prior to the individual, and that government is a high public duty that calls for the services of the wisest and best in the political society.

Socrates himself wrote nothing, and took no pains for the preservation or perpetuation of any of his ideas. But he was fortunate in the winning of two disciples (among many others)

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who have preserved for us and for all time the memory of his way of life and the record of his most notable conversations. To Xenophon we owe our main knowledge of the external facts of his career ; to Plato we are indebted for the reports of his incomparable dialogues.

§ 2. *Plato*

In Plato, Socrates was fortunate in having a disciple whose intellect was equal to his own. Indeed, it is probable that the disciple, in recording the arguments of the master, has added not a little of his own superb dialectic. But it is impossible to distinguish and separate the Socratic from the Platonic elements in the dialogues.

Born about 427 B.C., Plato (or Aristocles, as he was properly called) claimed descent both from Codrus, the last Athenian king, and from Solon, the great legislator. Trained as an athlete and a soldier, he fought in three battles during the Peloponnesian War, and in the intervals of war devoted himself to the study of science and the writing of poetry. When about twenty years old he met Socrates, and for

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the remaining eight years of the master's life he sat at his feet and made himself completely conversant with his modes of thought. In 399 B.C. Socrates suffered death at the hands of the ignorant and fanatical Athenian democracy, and Plato in grief and indignation left the murderous city and spent twelve years in an exile which he used to enlarge his knowledge of the world and man. At the end of this interval he returned to Athens, founded his famous Academy, and for the last forty years of his long life taught and wrote.

The one great aim and object of Plato's life was to record and to develop the doctrine of Socrates, among the fundamental principles of which were, first, that the supreme end of human existence is virtue ; secondly, that virtue is synonymous with knowledge ; and, thirdly, that intellect, the organ of knowledge, is the dominant factor in man. These general principles he applied to politics in the three dialogues known respectively as *The Republic*, *The Statesman*, and *The Laws*.

Of these three *The Republic* is by far the most notable and important. It is, indeed, one of the greatest of all the books in the world's literature. The purpose of the book was two-

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fold—viz. (1) to combat the political ideas of the Sophists, and (2) to criticize and condemn the political practices of the Greek Governments of the day, whether democracies, oligarchies, or tyrannies. In the book the evils of the time are attributed to lack of civic virtue due to ignorance, and both the ignorance and the corruption are traced to the false teaching of the Sophists. The case for the Sophists is stated by a certain Thrasymachus, who is presented in an exceedingly unfavourable light by Plato : he is boastful, blatant, bullying, and fundamentally stupid. Socrates soon reduces Thrasymachus to an impotent yet wrathful silence that can find no way of escape except in physical violence. When he has been got rid of, Socrates turns to the rest of his auditors, and in the process of a long discussion tries to discover a true philosophy of the relation of the State to the individual.

Only in the State can the individual attain to the good life. Therefore the supreme duty of the individual is to the State, and his obligations as a citizen take precedence of all other claims upon his loyalty. The "just" man is the man who takes his proper place in the life of his city, performs faithfully his civic functions, and sub-

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ordinates all his private interests to the public weal. An enormous amount of discussion centres round the connotation of the term "just," and it is ultimately agreed to define "justice" as "the harmonious performance of function." The well-ordered State consists of three great classes—viz. the guardians or councillors, the warriors or defenders, and the producers or workmen. Each "just" citizen finds his place in one of these three classes, and all co-operate for the common good. In order that the guardians and warriors may be entirely free from the distractions of private interest, and may be at leisure to devote all their energies to their public duties, they are to have no separate homes or individual property, but are to live in community, being provided with the necessities of life by the producers, and intermarrying periodically and temporarily as the magistrates direct. Since the working of this ideal commonwealth depends on virtue, and since virtue depends on knowledge, education plays a prominent part in Plato's political scheme. The training of the producers is merely technical; the warriors are drilled in gymnastics and the liberal arts until the age of twenty; but the guardians proceed beyond that age to a course

of science and philosophy which is not completed until they attain the mature age of thirty-five. After that, fifteen years of practical administration qualify the guardians for magistracy.

The communism of Plato's *Republic*—although it is political and not economic, a communism of poverty and homelessness—immediately and persistently militated against its usefulness in practical politics. The permanent value of the *Republic*, indeed, resides not in its specific proposals but in its lofty ethic, and, above all, in its magnificent emphasis on the priority of the State to the individual. Plato himself, indeed, perceived before long that he had pitched his political harmony in too high a key. Accordingly in his *Statesman*, and still more in his *Laws*, he came down lower in the scale of possibilities, and formulated schemes more compatible with average human nature. In the *Statesman* he inclines to think that the best practicable government is that of the "philosopher king" who rules according to law. In the *Laws*, abandoning the attempt to attain the ideal best, he comes to the conclusion that in this present imperfect world (where communistic guardians are not to be found, and where even

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philosopher kings are rare) a mixed constitution with division and separation of powers is the best actually practicable.

§ 3. *Aristotle*

The influence of Plato on political thought has been immense, particularly from the period of the Renaissance to the present day. Cicero, indeed, showed traces of it, and still more strongly St. Augustine. But the real Platonic revival began with Sir Thomas More and the sixteenth-century Utopians. From them the Platonic tradition passed to Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, and through them it tended to mould English thought of the nineteenth century by means of the writings of T. H. Green and his disciples. The influence of Plato is seen in the emphasis upon the State as a moral institution ; in its presentation as organic and not merely contractual ; in the insistence upon its educational functions, and, above all, in the proclamation of its sovereignty and the supremacy of its authority over the individual. On the political side Plato is the ancestor of modern Collectivism.

Until modern times, however (in spite of

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Cicero and St. Augustine), and particularly throughout the closing years of the Middle Ages, not Plato but Aristotle was the dominant philosopher. Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) was by birth not an Athenian but a Stagirite. His father, Nicomachus, was physician to Amyntas II., King of the rising State of Macedon. After spending his youth in and around his native town of Stagira, at the age of seventeen he proceeded to Athens and joined the Academy of Plato. As a pupil of Plato he remained in Athens for twenty years (367-347 B.C.), during which time he displayed powers which marked him out distinctly as the ablest of all the members of the school. His powers, however, were of an original and creative kind, and he was far from accepting the doctrines of Plato without question. Hence when Plato died the headship of the Academy went to an undistinguished nephew, and Aristotle departed from Athens for a twelve-year period of travel (347-335 B.C.). During this time he served for some years as tutor to the youthful Alexander of Macedon, known to history as the Great. In 335 B.C. he returned to Athens, founded a new school of philosophy at the Lyceum, and there taught till his death.

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The numerous works of Aristotle form a compendium of almost all the knowledge current in the Greek world of the fourth century B.C. They comprise logic, science, philosophy, art, history, ethics, economics, and politics. They differ widely in form from the works of Plato: they are treatises, not dialogues; lectures, not discussions; systematic and scientific, not vague and speculative. They differ, moreover, in substance; they repudiate the Platonic dogma that the ideal is the only reality, and emphasize the equal reality of the world of sense; they further reject all the Pythagorean mysticism and mathematics which marred Plato's later teaching.

The *Politics* of Aristotle is entirely lacking in the literary charm and moral elevation which make Plato's *Republic* a treasure for all time. It apparently consists of a combination of three sets of lectures which by no means form a very perfect unity. It seems probable, moreover, that the lectures in their present shape were not written by Aristotle himself, but were put together by pupils from mere notes, and that, too, many years after Aristotle's death. In the circumstances it is remarkable that the book should have any enduring worth. Yet so rich is it in ideas, so sound is its judgment, and so

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valuable is its information, that it remains, and always will remain, one of the classics of political science.

It begins with an emphatic repudiation of Plato's communism, emphasizing in the strongest possible manner the view that the very bases of the State are those institutions of the family and private property which Plato in his *Republic* had discarded. He then traces the evolution of the State from the family, through the village community, to its final goal in the self-sufficing and autonomous city, of which Athens is the supreme example. He dwells affectionately and lingeringly upon the characteristic features of this City-State which was to be so soon absorbed into the great Empire established by Aristotle's own pupil, Alexander of Macedon. The ideal City-State does not exceed 10,000 in the number of its inhabitants; the existence of a large slave community enables its citizens to devote all their time and attention to public affairs; it is protected by its own peculiar gods, whose worship is a part of the business of State; it is an end in itself to which all the personal ends of its citizens are subordinate; it is akin to an organism; it is natural and not artificial, for man is by nature a political animal; it is an

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association for the attainment of the supreme good, and apart from it no man can reach the highest life.

After exalting and defining the State, Aristotle proceeds to an elaborate and exhaustive classification of actual and existing States. He divides them, first of all, ethically, into true States whose aim is virtue, and false States which pursue some lower aim, such as power or riches. Secondly, he classifies them teleologically into normal States which seek the good of the citizens as a whole, and perverted States which prostitute their powers in the interests of some one particular class. Finally, he classifies them, according to the seat of sovereignty, into monarchies, aristocracies, and "polities," each of which has a perverted or debased form—viz. tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies.

Then follows much detail, extremely valuable but too voluminous and minute to be recorded here, respecting the various departments of State (legislative, executive, and judicial), the proper functions of the State (which Aristotle regards as numerous and wide), and the menaces to the security and stability of the State. Like Plato, Aristotle sees in education the principal prophylactic against revolution.

CHAPTER II

ROME

§ 1. *The Transition from Greece to Rome*

It would be difficult to find two thinkers of the first rank more sharply contrasted than were Plato and Aristotle. The one was philosophical and deductive, the other scientific and inductive ; the one synthetic, the other analytic ; the one subjective, the other objective ; the one abstract, the other concrete ; the one a believer in reason as the supreme guide of life, the other a believer in instinct ; the one regarding Society and the State as capable of indefinite modification at the hands of philosophers, the other impressed by the immobilities of custom, habit, and tradition. Yet both were agreed that the Greek City-State was the ideal form of polity ; both recognized that in their day the Greek City-State was threatened by many

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formidable foes, external and internal; both believed that by education—a civic education which should increase knowledge and virtue—the City-State might be reformed and saved.

In that belief they were mistaken. The day of the Greek City-State was already past. The day of the cosmopolitan Empire had arrived. Aristotle himself had helped to train the man who was destined to terminate the independence of the Greeks and to establish the first world-dominion in the West. The immediate causes of the fall of the Greek City-State were gross internal corruption (inimitably satirized in the comedies of Aristophanes); brutal oppression of the smaller States by the greater, and especially of the Ægean cities by Athens, of the Peloponnesian cities by Sparta, and the Bœotian cities by Thebes; fratricidal conflict among these same greater States, and particularly the deadly and protracted Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta (431–404 B.C.); and, finally, the Macedonian invasion and conquest, culminating in the Battle of Chæronea in 338 B.C. But apart from these immediate causes of destruction, the Greek City-State had inherent defects which rendered it both impossible and undesirable that it should survive as the final

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form of human organization. It was too small, too exclusive, too selfish, too quarrelsome, too tyrannical, too factious, too unstable, too much bound up with the institution of slavery. It did not deserve the Divine gift of immortality.

This is no place in which to retell the familiar story of the overthrow of the Greeks by Philip of Macedon, and of the making of the Macedonian Empire by his son, Alexander the Great. Suffice it to say that in thirteen crowded and miraculous years (336-323 B.C.) Alexander succeeded in establishing a dominion which extended from the Adriatic in the west to the Indus in the east. So far as the Greeks were concerned, the establishment of this dominion involved two things: on the one hand their City-States lost their independence and became mere municipalities in a vast military Empire; but on the other hand the Hellenic civilization was spread far and wide over regions whither no Greek had hitherto penetrated. The old invidious distinction between Greek and Barbarian was swept away; the Oriental was Hellenized, the Hellene was universalized.

In these circumstances, of course, Greek political theory, which postulated the autonomous City-State, became obsolete and irrele-

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vant. The city ceased to be the exclusive sphere of the good life ; politics no longer offered a career to the citizen ; the harmony between the State and the individual came to an end ; an alien and distant monarchy determined irresistibly the lives and destinies of the subject world. The sphere of the State had immeasurably expanded, but the sphere of the individual had lamentably contracted. Freedom and self-government were gone ; the supreme interest of politics had been subtracted from life.

How did Greek political theory adapt itself to the new conditions : There were, of course, some political thinkers who refused to see, or were unable to see, that any change had taken place. They continued to write as though the City-State enjoyed under the successors of Alexander the same autonomy as had marked it in the days of the Persian wars. Platonists such as Heraclides Ponticus, and Aristotelians such as Theophrastus, persisted in their controversies respecting deductive and inductive methods, State and individual, communism and private property, aristocracy and democracy, and so on. It is easy to understand the desperate conservatism of these old philosophers who refused to face the facts. For the political theory

of the Greeks was more than a mere philosophy of the State. To the Greeks, State, Society, Individual, even Deity, were all so closely allied—so nearly identified, indeed—that to them political theory was, beyond what it is to-day, a philosophy of life, an ethic, a metaphysic, a theology. There was no Church among the Greeks apart from the State, no religion outside the sphere of politics. Hence round the City-State centred all the social enthusiasm, all the moral fervour, all the religious zeal which to-day realize themselves in institutions other than political. Consequently the cult of the City-State died as hard as an ancient faith.

Beside the belated and obscurantist Platonists and Aristotelians, however, there were others who were prepared to face realities and to remould political philosophy so as to make it accord with the new facts of the post-Alexandrine age. Pre-eminent among these were the Epicureans and Stoics, to whom we must now turn. Before doing so, however, we will note the fact that on the death of Alexander the Great, the Empire which he had founded, but had not had time to consolidate, was rapidly disintegrated. For some time three large sections of it—viz. Macedonia itself, Syria, and Egypt—maintained a

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separate although languishing existence. But finally all of them—Macedonia in 149 B.C., Syria in 64 B.C., and Egypt in 30 B.C.—passed under the dominion of Rome. Greece, too, at the same date as Macedonia, was absorbed by Rome. Rome, indeed, was the true heir of Alexander, and the continuator of his policy. Rome, too, like Macedon, was Hellenic ; its civilization was that of Greece ; its language, its literature, its law, its art, its political ideas—all were developed under the dominant influence of the culture whose source was Athens, and whose disseminator was Alexander.

§ 2. *Epicureans and Stoics*

Both Epicureans and Stoics recognized the fact that the autonomous City-State had had its day and had ceased to be ; that politics no longer provided a career for every good citizen ; that the harmony between the State and the individual had been irreparably broken, and that the sphere of the good life must be found elsewhere than in the region of public affairs. The recognition of this fact was, no doubt, all the easier both to Epicurus (c. 340–270 B.C.) and to Zeno,

the founder of the Stoic school (340-260 B.C.), because though both made Athens their home, and both taught there, neither was native to the City-State. Epicurus was born on the Island of Samos, and was eighteen years of age before he moved to Athens and joined the Platonic Academy, just a quarter of a century after Plato's death, and one year after the tragic termination of Alexander's meteoric career. Zeno was still more remote : his father was a Phœnician, and his home was Cyprus. With him a distinctly Oriental element was imported into Greek philosophy. The City-State had no part or lot in his political speculation.

Epicurus found refuge from the obsolete *étatisme* of Plato and Aristotle in individualism. He reverted to the hedonism and utilitarianism of the Sophists. He taught that the self was the only reality that mattered ; that pleasure was the end of life ; that the State was merely a means to this end ; that it was an artificial creation based on contract or convention ; that law had no obligation except utility ; that justice was devoid of objective existence ; that religion was but an oppressive fiction ; that forms of government were matters of indifference, provided only that the Governments were strong enough and

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efficient enough to keep the peace and so enable the individual to pursue pleasure without fear of disturbance. The Epicurean tended to withdraw himself wholly from public affairs, and to devote himself entirely to self-gratification. His creed was not necessarily an ignoble one. Self-realization is not synonymous with sensuality. Nevertheless, in practice, Epicureanism generally degenerated into gross moral corruption, coupled with complete repudiation of all social duty. Hence Epicureanism made no general appeal to the Romans, in whom a sense of social duty was traditionally strong. The great poem of Lucretius and the various verses of Horace are almost the sole Latin expressions of the Epicurean philosophy.

Stoicism, on the other hand, made great headway in Rome—far greater, indeed, than it had ever made in Greece. It was a fine and elevated creed, austere and exacting ; a creed that took a powerful hold upon the nobler spirits of the Roman Empire, such as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius ; a creed that had many affinities with Christianity, and one which unquestionably prepared the way for the preachings of St. Paul. The Stoic made duty, not pleasure, his watchword. He sought satisfaction and peace, not

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by increasing the number of his gratifications until they equalled the number of his desires, but by diminishing his desires until they were reduced below the standard of his attainable gratifications. His was the life of abnegation and asceticism. He schooled himself to believe that external circumstances mattered little ; that it was of small concern to a man whether he were (like Epictetus) a slave or (like Marcus Aurelius) an emperor exercising autocratic power over a subservient world. He was not an individualist, not a nationalist, not even an internationalist, but a cosmopolitan. He regarded the whole human race as a single and indivisible unit. He looked upon man no longer as a creature of cities (ζῶον πολιτικόν) but as a member of one homogeneous community (ζῶον κοινωνικόν). He emphasized the essential equality of men. He treated the State as a natural institution only if it were universal and world-wide, as the Roman Empire aspired to be. If it were limited and sectional he considered it to be merely artificial and conventional. He recognized a law of Nature, eternal and supreme, whose dictates took precedence of all the enactments of human authority. He revered justice as a mandate of this law of Nature,

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and therefore as objective, eternal, immutable, and universal. To him religion connoted obedience to the all-pervading Reason which lay behind Nature and her laws, and the faithful performance of all the duties which conscience indicated as imperative. It was a matter of indifference to him whether the gods did or did not exist. If they did not exist, he could do without them. If they did exist, he was prepared to suffer whatever they might do to him.

Without question, the greatest of the Latin Stoics who speculated upon political theory was Seneca (c. 3 B.C.—A.D. 65), but before we deal with him and with the great Roman Jurists who succeeded him, almost all of whom were Stoics, we must note the political ideas of two earlier thinkers—viz. Polybius (204–122 B.C.) and Cicero (106–43 B.C.)—the second of whom was himself to some extent influenced by the Stoic philosophy.

§ 3. *Roman Political Theorists*

The first of the Roman political theorists, Polybius, was a Greek ! Resident in Rome for sixteen years (167–151 B.C.) as hostage for the

Achæan League, he came to be filled with admiration for the Roman polity, and eager to find an explanation of the success of Rome (once a City-State in no way superior to Athens or Sparta) as contrasted with the miserable failure of the Greek City-States. Hence he made a careful and detailed study of Roman history, as the result of which he left a monumental and invaluable work, in which he traced the course of Rome's amazing expansion from the beginning of the Punic Wars to his own day. Into the midst of his narrative he interjected a section (Book VI.) in which he attempted a philosophical analysis of the principles which had given to the Roman Constitution its matchless stability and strength. Let us summarize his results. Starting from the Aristotelian classification of States into monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, he comes to the conclusion that the differences between the three are external and institutional rather than internal and ideal ; that is, are due rather to rival forces than to antagonistic principles. He shows from examples that each of the three forms in its pure condition is unstable, because of the antagonism of the other two ; and he proves that in Greece a regular and rapid cycle of revolutionary change had

displayed itself in the following succession : monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, ochlocracy, and then, once more, monarchy and the whole cycle repeated. He considers that the strength and stability of Rome have been due to the fact that her constitution combines and harmonizes the three forms of State in a balanced unity—the monarchical principle represented by the consuls, the aristocratic by the senate, and the democratic by the popular assemblies. His is the first exposition of the theory of checks and balances in constitutional machinery. He obviously views the State not as an organism but as a mechanical contrivance, an adjustment of conflicting forces.

Before Polybius died the stability and harmony which he so much admired in Rome were already giving way to conflict and commotion. Beginning with the agitations of the Gracchi (133 B.C.), a century of struggle between the aristocracy and the democracy culminated in the fall of the Republic and the establishment of the Principate. Cicero wrote about a hundred years after Polybius, at the time when Julius Cæsar, by means of his victorious army, was establishing an imperial dictatorship in Rome. Cicero was an ardent republican who hated and

dreaded Cæsar, and was anxious to restore the honour of the senate and the power of the magistrates. In his works *De Republica* and *De Legibus* he inquired into the causes which had led to the sad decline in the commonwealth since the great days of Polybius. Starting from the Polybian theory of balance as the basis of stability, he attributes the tumults and calamities of his own day to the fact that the democratic element has been allowed to gain excessive and preponderant power—a power which has been appropriated and abused by demagogues such as Marius and Cæsar. He speaks in terms of glowing eloquence of the virtues of the Roman Republic and its constitution. He considers it to have been as near as is humanly possible to the ideal or “natural” State of the Stoic philosophy. For practical purposes he identifies the Roman Law—strong in its principles of justice and equity—with the Stoic *Jus Naturale* or Law of Nature. This is, indeed, his most important contribution to political theory. For it brings the Law of Nature down from the clouds onto the earth, and makes its principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity for the first time effectively operative among men.

It is rarely possible for a literary man to save

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a State. Cicero's opposition to Cæsar and to his nephew Augustus merely resulted in his own ruin and execution. The Roman Republic was transmuted into the Principate or, as it is usually called, Empire. One of the earliest and worst of the emperors was Nero, and for some eight years (A.D. 54-62) Seneca, who had been Nero's tutor, served as his Minister. The office of Minister to Nero was one which must have been a severe trial to an austere and upright philosopher of the Stoic school. The contrast between the ideal and the actual was too glaring to admit of reconciliation. On the one hand, the Stoic philosophy spoke of a primitive state of Nature, in which mankind was innocent and happy, even if undeveloped and ignorant ; a state in which the Law of Nature implanted in the conscience of every one was a sufficient guide and restraint ; in which there was no private property, no slavery, no government ; and in which freedom, equality, and brotherhood prevailed. On the other hand, there was the Empire administered by Nero. It was marked by abnormal corruption, colossal crime, widespread misery, violent repression, enormous inequalities, extensive slavery, furious hatreds almost verging on civil war. And yet, bad as

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it was, it was obviously better than would have been the anarchic chaos that would have resulted if it had been destroyed. Hence Seneca, and men like him, supported and defended the Empire. They felt that they had before them only a choice of evils—tyranny or anarchy—and of the two they preferred the former ; it was more amenable to restraint, and in the long run less cruel. But the times were out of joint, and there seemed no hope of any improvement. Hence the Stoic withdrew himself into the citadel of his soul, and endured as one to whom death is the only ultimate means of emancipation. We may remark, in passing, that the Stoic distinction between the ideal polity which obtained in the primitive state of Nature (and would obtain again if men were good), and the actual polity necessitated by human frailty and transgression, was one which was destined to prove exceedingly useful to the Christian Fathers when they, in turn, were faced with the problem of harmonizing the precepts of the Gospels with the practices of doubtfully converted Byzantine emperors.

Contemporary with Seneca, and succeeding him down to the time of Constantine (A.D. 306-337), a series of great Jurists—all, or nearly

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all, belonging to the Stoic school—applied the principles of philosophy to the practice of the Roman Law. In particular they used the Stoic idea of a supreme and authoritative *Jus Naturale*—really the dictates of an educated conscience and a sanctified common sense—to purify and exalt the Roman *Jus Civile*, and to extend the prætorian *Jus Gentium*. The principles of the *Jus Naturale* led necessarily to a mitigation of the rigours of slavery, for, as Ulpian remarked, “according to the Law of Nature, all men are equal.” It led, too, to the alleviation of the horrors of war, to the elevation of family life, to the diffusion of property, and to an important assertion of the popular source of the imperial authority.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH

§ 1. *The Politics of the New Testament*

THE Emperor Constantine, in the year A.D. 313, recognized Christianity as a legal religion in the Roman Empire. During the three centuries which had intervened between the time of Christ and that momentous date the Christian Church had passed through some strange vicissitudes. We can distinguish four main periods, which we will call, and broadly define as, the periods centring in (1) Jerusalem to A.D. 50, (2) Antioch A.D. 50-150, (3) Alexandria A.D. 150-250, and (4) Rome A.D. 250-313.

In the first period—that of Christ and the Twelve—a supreme indifference to politics, as to all things terrestrial, marked the attitude of the little band, both Master and Disciples. Their concern was not with the seen and temporal, but

with the unseen and eternal. They proclaimed the imminent end of the age and the rapid approach of a day of judgment in which spiritual values would alone receive recognition, and in which it would be a matter of no importance whatsoever whether in this transitory and probationary life a man had been a prince or a pauper, an aristocrat or a democrat, a republican or a monarchist. The little community itself was of the nature of a State—an *imperium in imperio*—although it lacked all the paraphernalia of the ordinary earthly dominion, such as territory, revenue, military forces, police. In spite, however, of the absence of these, it called itself a Kingdom rather than a Church ; it recognized Christ as its monarch ; from Him it accepted laws which superseded even the sacrosanct legislation of the Mosaic code ; it developed autonomous institutions. Its political (as opposed to ecclesiastical) phraseology had portentous results. On the one hand, it excited the Jews to a belief that Christ's " Kingdom " was an organization which might be used as a means to throw off the hateful Roman yoke ; on the other hand, it alarmed the Roman Government, and ultimately led to the crucifixion of the Master as a would-be " King of

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the Jews." Nevertheless, Christ had been particularly careful to make it clear, both to excited Jews and to perturbed Romans, that He was not in the least interested in the political problems which occupied their minds, and that He had no desire at all either to re-establish the dominion of David or to challenge the sovereignty of Cæsar. In the course of His teachings He gave utterance to two remarks which must be classed as among the most momentous recorded in the annals of political ideas. They are, first, "My kingdom is not of this world" (John xviii. 36), and, second, "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's" (Matt. xxii. 21 and Mark xii. 17). These profound utterances proclaimed the emancipation of religion from politics, the separation of their spheres, the delimitation of their boundaries. They marked the founding of a Church distinct from the State. They signalized the termination of that subordination of divine worship to civil administration which had been the conspicuous characteristic of both the Greek and the Roman City-State.

The attitude of aloofness from terrestrial concerns which marked Christ and the Twelve did not long survive the Crucifixion. On the

one hand, the expected end of the world did not occur, and the Church of Jerusalem, which had staked its all upon it and had communistically pooled its property, found itself in a condition of embarrassing destitution. On the other hand, the Gospel spread beyond the borders of Judæa ; it began to make converts among the Gentiles ; it came into contact with the Oriental cults, and was profoundly influenced by them ; it developed a new theology of incarnation, atonement, regeneration, and immortality which speedily removed it to an immense distance from the Judaism within which it started. St. Paul was the new theologian, and Antioch (where the disciples were first called Christians) was the base from which the novel evangel spread. It made its way swiftly and victoriously through Asia Minor, Macedonia, and Greece, until it reached Rome itself. Everywhere it was welcomed by multitudes among the Gentiles, but everywhere it roused the most intense antagonism of the Jews. St. Paul was a Roman citizen, and he had no hesitation whatsoever in using to the full the powers and privileges which his citizenship gave him for the protection of himself and the furtherance of the cause he had at heart. On numerous occasions his appeals to

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the civil authorities saved him from disaster, and secured his infant churches from extinction. Hence he looked gratefully and benevolently upon the imperial authority of Rome ; he considered that in keeping the peace and enforcing law it was doing the same work as the Church, though on a lower plane, and that it was a useful schoolmaster to bring men to Christ. Hence he taught the divine origin of civil authority : " The powers that be are ordained of God " (Rom. xiii. 1) ; he exhorted his converts to pray " for kings and for all that are in authority " (1 Tim. ii. 2) ; he urged the duty of obedience, saying : " Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work " (Titus iii. 1). Nevertheless, much as he appreciated his Roman citizenship, and cordially as he recognized the Roman Empire, he continued strongly to emphasize that distinction between Church and State, between the elect and the world, which had been so conspicuously a feature of Christ's teaching. " Dare any of you," he says indignantly to the erring Corinthians, " having a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not before the saints ? " (1 Cor. vi. 1), clearly indicating that the Church of

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Corinth was a self-governing institution having its own officers and its proper machinery for the administration of justice.

It is interesting, further, in the writings of St. Paul to find teachings closely akin to those of the Stoics in, *e.g.* the recognition of a law of Nature written in the hearts and consciences of men, irrespective of race or circumstance (Rom. ii. 12-15), and the assertion of the equality of all men in grace, irrespective of their earthly condition (Philemon 10-17).

Doctrines entirely in accord with those of St. Paul are expressed by the writer of the so-called First Epistle of St. Peter: "Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake. . . . Fear God. Honour the king" (1 Pet. ii. 13-17).

§ 2. *The Period of the Persecutions*

This happy harmony between the Roman Empire and the Christian Church did not long continue. On the one hand, the Empire, for all its tolerance, insisted that its subjects, without exception, should offer sacrifices and perform services which were inconsistent with Christian

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principle. On the other hand, the Church refused to accept a place as merely one of the tolerated religions of the Empire. It was not content to be regarded simply as either a peculiar form of Judaism, or as one of an extensive group of Oriental cults. It proclaimed Christianity to be the one and only true and universal faith, and when the gods of the Pantheon declined to be recognized as mere forerunners of Christ, it denounced them as devils. This was irritating to the populace, still more so to the pagan priests, and most of all to the Emperor, as, *ex officio*, *pontifex maximus*. Hence sprang up an alienation of the Church from the Empire. The Christians began to be denounced as "anti-social" and as "enemies of the human race," and denunciation led to occasional tumults and even to spasmodic persecutions. The Christians on their part—full of enthusiasm, eager for martyrdom, and confident of Paradise—did nothing to conciliate hostile prejudice. Thus alienation widened into open antagonism. This growing antagonism was the characteristic of what I have called the Alexandrine period of the history of the early Church (A.D. 150–250). It was, indeed, in Alexandria itself that the conflict between the devotees of the pagan cults

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and the believers in the Christian mysteries blazed forth in its most tumultuary violence. The Roman Empire ceased to be the protector and patron of the infant Church ; it became its enemy, anxious for its suppression, and occasionally visiting it with sanguinary severity. In response the Church changed its attitude towards the Empire. It no longer regarded it as a divinely appointed harbinger of the Gospel, as a sacred conservator of the peace, as a school-master leading men by way of the law to Christ, but as an ally of the devil in the work of frustrating the purposes of the Redeemer, and of preventing the salvation of the world. It adopted the view of the Empire prophetically presented in the Revelation of St. John the Divine, where Rome is spoken of as " Babylon . . . the great whore . . . the mother of harlots and abominations of the earth," and where it is represented as " drunken with the blood of the saints and with the blood of the martyrs " (Rev. xvii. 1-9).

Even more formidable, however, and more alarming to the secular authority than the exclusiveness and unsociability of the Christian cult, were the growing numbers and the developing organization of the Church. It gradually became, under its deacons, priests, bishops, and

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patriarchs, a highly articulated and immensely powerful *imperium in imperio*, rivalling in its organization and its resources even the might and majesty of the Empire itself. In the middle of the third century the Emperor Decius declared that he dreaded the Bishop of Rome more than an anti-Cæsar. Hence he initiated the awful "general persecutions," which lasted, with intervals, from A.D. 251 to A.D. 311. During that terrible and tremendous sixty years the Empire, under some of its most capable and patriotic rulers, put forth the whole of its power to stamp out the Christian Church. It completely failed to achieve its purpose, and it frankly recognized its failure. The persecuting edicts were repealed in A.D. 311. Two years later the Emperor Constantine, as we have seen, recognized Christianity as one of the legal religions of the Empire. This recognition virtually meant establishment, for the brains of paganism were out, and spiritually it was dead. For eighty years, however—an interesting period of toleration amid long centuries of persecutions—Christianity and the cults existed side by side, the one rapidly advancing in imperial favour and popular approval, the others as swiftly declining. Finally, in A.D. 392, the Emperor

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Theodosius I. closed the temples and prohibited the continuance of the pagan sacrifices. Christianity became the sole legal religion in the Empire.

§ 3. *From Constantine to Augustine*

The so-called "conversion" of Constantine was a curious phenomenon, and it had some remarkable results. Its causes were as obviously political as were the causes of the unsuccessful persecutions which preceded it. Constantine, like his predecessor Diocletian, was primarily anxious to restore the broken unity of the Empire. Diocletian had hoped to effect his purpose by the extermination of the bishops; Constantine hoped to effect the same purpose by the exploitation of the same officials. The bishops gratefully welcomed the change in the counsels of the palace; it was a pleasing permutation of Providence which called them to warm their hands before the imperial fires instead of themselves constituting their fuel. They were compelled, however, to accept Constantine as a patron, not as a penitent; as a master and not as a disciple. He did not even receive

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Christian baptism until, twenty-four years after his conversion, he came to his deathbed. He remained all his life *pontifex maximus*, and he assumed, as by imperial right, the headship of the Christian Church in his dominions. He was *episcopus episcoporum*. Though still unbaptized, he called, and presided at the opening of, the great Ecumenical Council of Nicæa (A.D. 325), held in his summer palace, and he was hailed as "supreme lord."

The Christian Church, in short, was put into the position which it had deliberately refused to accept in the first century. It was converted into a department of State, and its bishops became Government officials. The separation between politics and religion was officially brought to an end. The conception of the subordination of the Pontificate to the Principate which had dominated the pagan Empire reasserted itself. The injunction "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and to God the things that are God's" lost its meaning. Cæsar became the representative of God upon earth, and obedience to him a divinely instituted duty. The conversion of the Empire, therefore, might equally appropriately be termed the paganization of the Church.

The recrudescence of pagan political theory which was implied when Constantine, in his imperial capacity, summoned and presided over the Council of Nicæa, was not accepted without demur among the faithful. Many of the more devout, horrified by the secularization of the Church, withdrew from society altogether, and as hermits or monks sought sanctity in solitude and asceticism. Others, concerned with politics as well as with religion, and alarmed at the increase in autocracy which ecclesiastical power gave to the Emperor, broke out into revolts which were frequently fortified by heresy. Arianism in Gothia, Donatism in Africa, Nestorianism in Armenia, and Eutychianism in Egypt and Syria, were to no small extent national risings against the Cæsaro-papism which centralized all might, majesty, dominion, and power among men in a single ruler residing at Constantinople, and deriving his tremendous authority, civil and ecclesiastical, no longer from his subjects, but from the King of Heaven.

In the main, however, in spite of monastic secession and nationalist revolt, Cæsaro-papism (the union of both temporal and spiritual sovereignty in the Emperor), established itself throughout the eastern (Greek and Oriental)

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præfectures of the Roman Empire. Patriarchs like the great St. Chrysostom, who protested or resisted, trying to retain ecclesiastical independence, were crushed and superseded. Those who wished to keep their episcopal seats had to adopt the submissive attitude of Optatus, bishop of Milevis, who said of the Emperor : " Above him there is none save God alone " ; or of Ambrosiaster, who spoke of him as " Vicar of God, having the image of God."

Very different, however, was it in the western (Latin and Occidental) præfectures of the Empire. The great Bishops of Italy, Africa, Spain, and Gaul, when once Constantine was dead, refused to continue to recognize the spiritual supremacy of secular rulers, who were not infrequently men of evil lives and unsound theological beliefs. Before the end of the fourth century St. Ambrose of Milan said to the Emperor Valentinian III. (who had ordered him to invest an Arian with a see) : " In the matter of faith, bishops are wont to judge emperors, not emperors bishops." A century later (A.D. 494) Pope Gelasius, writing to the Emperor Anastasius in Constantinople, put the Occidental view in the most unmistakable language when he said : " There are two powers, august Emperor, by which this world is chiefly

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ruled—viz. the sacred authority of the priests and the imperial power. . . . In the reception of the heavenly mysteries you should be subordinate rather than superior to the religious order.”

It was this question of the final authority in matters ecclesiastical, rather than any specific differences in dogma and ritual, that ultimately caused the irremediable schism between Greek and Latin Christendom. The Orthodox Church of the East settled down to reactionary stagnation under the dead hand of the Byzantine Cæsars; the Catholic Church of the West reasserted its spiritual independence under the headship of the Bishop of Rome. The result was that for a thousand years in Western Europe the relation of the sovereign and independent Church to the secular power was the central problem of political controversy.

This great debate may be said to have begun in the writings of St. Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-430). The saint did not, indeed, concern himself with it directly; his prime business was to suppress schismatics such as the Donatists, to convert heretics such as the Pelagians, or to refute and convince pagans such as Volusianus. But he was continually forced to face it, and—

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particularly in his treatises against the Donatists, and, above all, in his famous *City of God*—he gives a clear indication of his attitude. He recognizes the Roman Emperor, admits that he receives his authority from Heaven, enjoins, in the language of St. Paul, the duty of obedience on the part of subjects to the Imperial commands, and calls upon the Emperor to defend the Church, suppress schism, and stamp out heresy. But he does not for a moment allow that he has any authority, as Emperor, within the sacred precincts of the ecclesia. Questions of faith and morals are matters to be dealt with exclusively in the councils of the Church, at the hands of duly consecrated bishops. He emphasizes in the strongest possible manner the distinction between the *Civitas Dei*, or City of God, and the *Civitas Terrena*, or Earthly City, which the consequences of the conversion of Constantine had obscured. The things of God are once more separated from the things of Cæsar.

If it is asked what precisely St. Augustine meant by the two cities, the *Civitas Dei* and the *Civitas Terrena*, it is not easy to give an answer. At the beginning of his great apologetic the one stands for Christianity and the other for Pagan-

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ism, and the saint occupies himself in proving (1) that Christianity is not responsible for the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in A.D. 410, and (2) that Paganism in the day of its ascendancy had not saved Rome from disaster and defeat. Later the *Civitas Dei* is identified with the visible and hierarchical Church, while the *Civitas Terrena* is simply and obviously the world outside the Church. But finally, and normally, the *Civitas Dei* is the *communio sanctorum*, or society of the elect, known in its fulness only to God; and the *Civitas Terrena* is the antagonistic *communio perditorum*, or society of the reprobate, which had its source and origin in the angels who, before the creation of the world, fell from Paradise.

But whatever may be the connotation of the two cities, the outstanding fact to be noted is that St. Augustine, together with most of the other Christian Fathers, is impressed, and, indeed, oppressed, by the duality of things. Like Seneca and the Stoics, he is faced by an apparently eternal and irreconcilable antagonism between the ideal and the actual, between good and evil, between Church and World, between spiritual authority and secular authority, between God and Mammon.

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We must proceed to note how in the sphere of statecraft and the field of political theory the mediæval administrators and speculators endeavoured to resolve this disquieting dualism:

CHAPTER IV

THE MIDDLE AGES

§ 1. *The Holy Roman Empire*

THE period following the years which saw the composition of St. Augustine's *City of God* (A.D. 412-427) was one of terror and of horror for the western præfectures of the Roman Empire. The cause which led Augustine to write his great work was, as we have seen, the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in A.D. 410. But that world-shaking event was but the beginning of woes. The barriers of the Empire having been broken down, the barbarians overran the whole of the Latin Occident; Angles and Saxons occupied Britain; Franks and Burgundians took possession of Gaul; Visigoths and Sueves of Spain; Vandals of Africa. St. Augustine himself died in his episcopal city of Hippo during its siege by the ferocious invaders

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(A.D. 430). Barbarian kings took the places of Roman governors, and rudimentary national States began to display their embryonic features where erstwhile had been the provinces of the world-wide dominion of the Cæsars.

Thus the power of imperial Rome passed away in the west. But, as it did so, the power of Papal Rome increased. The barbarian kings were, through the monks and missionaries sent out by the Pope, won over to the Christian faith, and before the end of the eighth century the unity of the Catholic Church had succeeded to the broken unity of the Roman Empire. Moreover, although the effective power of imperial Rome had passed away in the west, the Roman Empire, seated at Constantinople, still continued to exist and even to flourish in the east. As a political fiction, Britain, Gaul, Spain, Africa, and Italy remained subject to the Byzantine ruler. Occasionally barbarian kings, although wholly independent in fact, condescended to accept from the distant Cæsar such honorific titles as "consul" or "patrician," thus recognizing his visionary overlordship. For one short period, under Justinian in the sixth century, the Emperor actually recovered some authority over Africa, Italy, and Southern Spain.

THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

The Latin mind, indeed, refused to consider the possibility of the extinction of the Roman dominion. Rome was the eternal city, and the Empire which it had established was destined to endure for ever. Thus in the eighth century of the Christian Era the barbarian kingdoms of Western Europe were not only bound together by actual communion in the Catholic Church, but were also knit to one another by an imaginary subjection to the Byzantine Cæsar. The Pope recognized the Cæsar as his temporal lord ; the Cæsar regarded the Pope as one of his provincial bishops.

But the relations between Roman Bishop and Byzantine Emperor had long been extremely bad. The Emperor was frequently a heretic, and he always exercised an autocracy in ecclesiastical affairs which the Pope could not possibly allow. The Pope, for his part, not only asserted in ecclesiastical affairs an independence intolerable to the Emperor, but also exercised a temporal authority over Rome and other regions in Italy, which the Emperor regarded as an insufferable usurpation. The friction came to a head at the end of the eighth century, and Pope Leo III. decided once and for all to throw off the Byzantine yoke. It did not occur to him,

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however, simply to take the negative step, and sever his connection with the Roman Empire, now centred in Constantinople. What he resolved to do, and in his own opinion actually did, was to declare the Byzantine ruler, the Empress Irene, deposed because of enormous crimes, and, by means of the divine authority committed to him as the successor of Peter, "translate" the imperial authority intact to a more worthy representative of God. The person whom he selected for this distinguished honour was Charles the Great, King of the Franks, and he duly crowned his nominee on Christmas Day, A.D. 800, in his basilica at Rome.

Now, Charles the Great (A.D. 768-814) was a mighty potentate who ruled over dominions in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy, hardly inferior in extent and resources to those of the western præfectures of the old Roman Empire itself. He was a Catholic Christian, devout according to the standards of his age. He had absorbed the Roman culture, and had done much to spread education and foster learning. Above all, he had gone far to re-establish the Roman peace throughout his vast dominions, and to bring back something of the prosperity which had marked the great days of the old Cæsars.

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There is no doubt that he himself aspired to the title of Roman Emperor, and that he had decided to take steps to secure it. But in two vitally important respects his plans and projects differed from those of Leo III. First, he did not for a moment wish to acquire dominion over the whole undivided Roman Empire; his ambition was limited to the west. Secondly, he intensely disliked the idea of receiving the imperial office from the hands of the Pope; he hoped to make an arrangement with the Empress Irene (whom at one time he proposed to marry) so as to partition the Empire and restore the dual control which had prevailed in the fourth century under Valens and Valentinian, and in the fifth under Arcadius and Honorius.

Hence we read without surprise in the pages of a contemporary chronicler that Charles was furiously angry at the way in which—by Papal hands and before any agreement had been reached with Constantinople—the imperial dignity had been thrust upon him. The manner of Charles's investiture, indeed, did, as a matter of fact, raise acute difficulties both for Charles himself and for his successors. In particular, in the realm of political theory, it revived in a most perplexing and complicated form the

problem of the "two powers." Was the Empire conferred upon Charles a *renovatio* of the partial Empire of Honorius, or a *translatio* of the integral Empire of Constantine? Whence did the Emperor derive his authority—from heaven or from men; and, if from heaven, directly from God, or mediately through the Pope? What was the relation of the Empire to the Papacy? Was the Emperor the servant of the Pope, or was the Pope the servant of the Emperor; or were they equal and co-ordinate, each supreme in his own sphere? What were the functions of the Emperor? Were they to reunite and rule the world, or to defend and enlarge the Church? Here were questions which distracted the minds of political theorists, as well as practical statesmen, for half a millennium.

§ 2. *The Two Powers*

Under strong emperors, such as Charles the Great, Otto I., or Henry III., without any dispute, the imperial authority reigned supreme in all causes and over all persons, whether secular or ecclesiastical. The tradition of Constantine and of his pagan predecessors was maintained;

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religion was treated as a department of politics, and bishops (including the Bishop of Rome) were regarded as State officials to be appointed and deposed by imperial authority in the same manner as secular officials. On the other hand, under strong Popes such as Nicholas I. or Innocent III., again without any dispute, the papal authority was pre-eminent. Kings, including the Emperor, were censured, excommunicated, deposed; and the control of the papal curia was exercised, by means of legates and nuncios, over the minutest and most domestic affairs of State. So far all was clear, even if the oscillations of sovereignty were perplexing.

But what occurred when a strong Pope and a strong Emperor happened to rule simultaneously? What was the result when the new Christian *pontifex maximus* came into conflict with the old Roman *pontifex maximus*? What was the outcome when the papal theory of the inherent superiority of the spiritual over the temporal clashed with the imperial theory of the omnicompetence of Cæsar? Then it was that trouble began. Then it was that Christendom was torn by suicidal war. Then it was that the ideal and indivisible *Respublica Christiana* was split into antagonistic factions, and that the

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peace of the world was shattered by hurtling bans and fulminating bulls.

There were four such great conflicts during the course of the Middle Ages—viz. those between (1) the Emperor Henry IV. and Pope Gregory VII., (2) the Emperor Frederick I. and Popes Hadrian IV. and Alexander III., (3) the Emperor Frederick II. and Popes Gregory IX. and Innocent IV., and (4) the Emperor Louis IV. and Pope John XXII. Each of these conflicts gave rise to a voluminous controversial literature. It would be interesting, if space permitted, to distinguish these controversies and to note the different attitudes taken up and the various arguments employed. It must suffice, however, on the present occasion to define the three main positions occupied and maintained.

FIRST, there were those, not very numerous until the end of the Middle Ages, who defended the old Roman position (which was also, as we have seen, the Byzantine position, and which was to become, later on, the position of Henry VIII. in England) that the secular ruler—whether deriving his authority from the people or drawing it directly from God—was supreme over all causes and all persons in his dominions. This was the position assumed by Constantine ;

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adopted by Charles the Great ; formally proclaimed by Frederick II. ; supported by the civilians who revived the study of the Roman Law at Bologna and elsewhere from the twelfth century onwards ; apparently accepted by Dante in his *Monarchiâ* * (c. A.D. 1310) ; but for the first time fully displayed in the remarkable *Defensor Pacis* of Marsiglio of Padua (A.D. 1324). The theory implied by this position identified religion with politics, reduced the Church to a department of State, and was scarcely compatible with a Christianity that was either ethical or spiritual.

Secondly, there were those who were content to maintain the much more moderate and conciliatory view that Pope and Emperor were equal and co-ordinate powers, each having his own sphere of operation and his own proper duties to perform. This was the doctrine expressed by harassed Emperors struggling for independence against aggressive Popes ; it was echoed by harassed Popes struggling for independence against aggressive Emperors. Thus

* Dante's *De Monarchiâ* is conspicuously, and probably intentionally, lacking in clarity. Mr. W. H. V. Reade, in his excellent Clarendon Press edition (1916), is inclined to place Dante in the second class of thinkers next to be noted.

the Emperor Frederick I., writing to Pope Eugenius III. in A.D. 1152, says : " God has established two powers by which this world should be ruled—viz. the Papacy and the Empire." In a manifesto issued five years later against the less placable Pope Adrian IV., he expresses the same dualistic opinion with added emphasis : " We hold this kingdom and Empire through the election of the princes from God alone, who by the Passion of His Son placed this world under the rule of two swords. Moreover, the Apostle Peter says : ' Fear God ; honour the king.' Therefore, whoever asserts that we hold the imperial crown as a benefice from the Pope, resists the Divine institution, contradicts the teaching of Peter, and is a liar." The refreshing conciseness of this utterance, with its pleasing freedom from ambiguity, is repeated in the famous Declaration of Rense, issued by the Electors in A.D. 1338 : " The Emperor obtains his office solely through his election by those who have the right to vote in imperial elections, without the confirmation and approval of any one else, and in secular affairs he has no superior on earth." A similar claim on behalf of the spiritual power for independence of the temporal power is all that Popes such as Leo III.

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dare to make in face of powerful and resolute Emperors; all, indeed, that so mighty a Pontiff as Gregory VII. (Hildebrand) ventures at first to make in his tremendous struggle respecting investitures with the Emperor Henry IV.

This dualistic compromise, however, was not the doctrine which in the main dominated the central period of the Middle Ages. The prevalent doctrine for the five centuries A.D. 800-1300 was that the Pope was superior to the Emperor, and that the Emperor derived his authority from the Pope. Innocent III. expressed this view clearly enough when he said: "It is the business of the Pope to look after the interests of the Roman Empire, since the Empire derives its origin and its final authority from the Papacy"; and, again: "As God, the creator of the universe, set two great lights in the firmament of heaven, the greater to rule the day and the lesser to rule the night, so He set two great dignities in the firmament of the universal Church, the greater to rule the day—that is, souls—and the lesser to rule the night—that is, bodies. These dignities are the Papal authority and the royal power. And just as the moon gets her light from the sun, and is inferior to the sun in quality, position, and effect, so the royal

power gets the splendour of its dignity from the Papal authority."

Such was the dominant ecclesiastical view, during the central period of the Middle Ages, of the relation between the two powers—the spiritual and the temporal—which jointly ruled (under God) the *Respublica Christiana*. This view was maintained by an amazing array of irrelevant texts from the Bible, by endless and incredible quotations from the Fathers, by arguments based on the inherent superiority of the soul to the body and of the sun to the moon, and by a bewildering collection of edifying narratives from both sacred and profane history. As an exhibition of logical method it would be difficult to find anything in modern literature to correspond to it, except the dialectics of *Alice in Wonderland*.

§ 3. *Mediæval Political Thinkers*

Prominent as was the controversy respecting the two powers in mediæval political speculation, we should carry away a one-sided impression of the scope and range of the publicists of the period if we were to suppose that they treated

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of nothing else. Many other political problems engaged their passing attention from time to time. They rarely treated them fully or systematically, because, as a rule, the problems with which they dealt rose merely incidentally as side issues in the course of some theological debate or other. A few only of the leading writers can here be noted.

Among the champions of the Papal supremacy were four notable men. (1) St. Bernard of Clairvaux (A.D. 1091-1153), while emphasizing the inherent superiority of the spiritual to the temporal, makes a notable plea to the Church to free herself from the snares of secular concerns and to devote her energies to the great task of saving the souls of men. (2) John of Salisbury (A.D. 1110-1180), in his *Policraticus*, one of the most remarkable treatises on political science produced during the Middle Ages, develops an extraordinarily full and elaborate organic theory of the State, in which he draws out a close and detailed analogy between the human frame and the body politic. He also, in a manner strikingly reminiscent of the Stoics, lays emphasis on a "law," eternal, immutable, and independent of all human enactment, to whose authority all monarchs must bow. He treads more debatable

ground when he argues in favour of "tyrannicide," that is, the murder of monarchs who either oppress the Church or persistently refuse to obey the eternal law. (3) St. Thomas Aquinas (A.D. c. 1227-1274), greatest of mediæval philosophers, emphatically repudiates the dangerous doctrine of tyrannicide advanced by John of Salisbury. He follows up, however, John's important discussion of the place and province of "law" and he immensely clarifies that fundamental political conception. He distinguishes four kinds of laws—viz. first, *eternal* (that is, those laws which are said to "govern" the universe); secondly, *divine*; thirdly, *natural*; and, fourthly, *human*, or positive. He makes a marked advance on the Stoic political philosophy when he defines *law natural* as the unrevealed law of God. But even more important than St. Thomas's clarification of the conception of "law" is his reintroduction (after more than a thousand years' oblivion) of the *Politics* of Aristotle into western political theory. He interprets the Greek philosopher in terms of Christian theology, and effects a masterly fusion of Aristotle and Augustine. Hence his political philosophy, as set forth in his *De Regimine Principum*, is incomparably fuller and more

systematic than that of any preceding mediæval writer. (4) Ægidius Romanus (A.D. 1247-1316) was a disciple of Aquinas. He added little that was new to the teaching of his master, but he presented his master's doctrine in a handy and intelligible form that made his textbook a potent influence in the controversies of the fourteenth century.

The controversies of the fourteenth century, although they included that of the Emperor Louis IV. with Pope John XXII., raged, not primarily round the Empire and the Papacy, but round the position and powers of national kings (such as Edward I. of England and Philip IV. of France) in relation to the papal curia. And the controversy between Louis IV. and John XXII. was itself at bottom a quarrel between a German and a Frenchman. In the fourteenth century the principle of nationality was asserting itself strongly, and national kings were beginning to claim a sovereignty of the Byzantine sort over all causes and persons within their dominions. This inevitably led to mortal conflict with the cosmopolitan and all-controlling Papacy, whose rights to universal jurisdiction were never propounded more loftily and uncompromisingly than by Pope Boniface VIII.—

who was reigning in Rome when the century dawned—in his famous Bull *Unam Sanctam* (A.D. 1302).

The cause of the national kings against the Papal claims to suzerainty was set forth by a number of writers, prominent amongst whom were John of Paris (*fl.* c. A.D. 1300) with his *Tractatus de regia potestate et papali* ; Peter Dubois (A.D. c. 1255–c. 1312) with his *De Recuperatione Terræ Sanctæ* ; and John Wycliffe (A.D. 1320–1384) with his two treatises *De Dominio*.

But most notable of all late mediæval writers on politics (because prematurely modern) was Marsiglio of Padua.

CHAPTER V

RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION

§ 1. *Marsiglio and Machiavelli*

MARSIGLIO OF PADUA (A.D. c. 1278-1343) was a marvellous person. Medical man, ecclesiastic (at one time actually holder of the ambrosial Archbishopric of Milan, although later excommunicated and indexed), lawyer, soldier, and politician, he emancipated himself more completely than any other of his famous contemporaries from the ideas and implications of the Middle Ages. Though called to Munich by the Emperor Louis IV. to assist him in his embittered controversy with Pope John XXII., he entirely ignored the existence of such an institution as the Holy Roman Empire ; and he advanced ideas which were almost as subversive of imperial as of papal authority. He taught, it is true, the subservience of Church to State and of clergy

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to kings ; but he also taught that both pontiffs and princes hold no authority by Divine right, but that they all alike receive it as a delegation from the sovereign people. Though reminiscent of the political theory of the old Roman lawyers, it was for the fourteenth century a conception so novel and so alien from the common ways of thought that, after the Papacy had dubbed it as “damnable” and the Empire had set it aside as antiquated, it remained in reserve until the men of the Renaissance caught it up. Marsiglio’s *Defensor Pacis* (A.D. 1324) deals with three themes—viz. first, the State ; secondly, the Church ; and thirdly, the relation between the two. According to Marsiglio (1) the end of civil Government is peace, and for the attainment of peace monarchical is better than republican rule ; monarchs, however, must not suppose that they possess any inherent or mystical authority ; such power as they enjoy is conferred upon them by the people, and they continue to exercise it subject to popular control, and within the limitations of law, which proceeds not from themselves, but from the people who elected them ; (2) as for the Church, it consists, not, as is commonly assumed, of the clergy alone, but of the whole body of Christian men and

women ; supreme authority in the Church, therefore, resides not in clerical synods, still less in the papal curia, but in a general council wherein both clergy and laity are represented, and where the better part (not necessarily a majority) determines the issue ; as to the clergy, they should restrict themselves to their spiritual functions, should not meddle with temporal concerns, and should not impede their religious activity by the possession of mundane property ; as to the Pope, he is a mere agent of the general council of believers, having no inherent pre-eminence over any other Christian ; (3) as to the relation of State to Church, both consist of the same people, although grouped differently ; the spiritual power no doubt will claim ascendancy in the next world ; in this world the secular power must be supreme. Marsiglio was a revolutionary thinker, born a couple of centuries before his time.

The period which intervened between Marsiglio and his intellectual brother, Machiavelli (A.D. 1469-1527), was the great transitional era of the Renaissance. It saw the decline of both the Empire and the Papacy to political insignificance ; the rise of the modern national-state system ; the establishment of strong monarchies

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in Spain, France, and England ; the disintegration of Germany and Italy into petty principalities and municipalities ; the development of a new art of war in which gunpowder played the primary part ; the invention of printing ; the discovery of America ; the Copernican revelation of the immensity of the universe, and the demonstration of the falsity of the mediæval cosmography. In the course of this political and intellectual upheaval, the Middle Ages passed imperceptibly away and the Modern World was born.

Machiavelli, a native of the small but splendid republic of Florence, was an Italian patriot who perceived that his country, owing to its disintegration and turbulence, was being left behind in the race for power by the great national States of the West, and that it was likely at no distant date to be conquered and annexed by either France or Spain, or else to be destroyed in the course of a conflict between the two for possession. Hence he passionately desired to find some means by which a united Italy could be formed, capable of resisting aggression, expelling the foreigners, establishing law and order, and providing the conditions needed for the development of art and culture. To further

this end, he wrote his three great books—viz. his *Art of War*, his *Discourses on Livy*, and his *Prince*. He was a practical statesman, not a political idealist ; and his works are treatises on the art of government, not on the theory of the State. He asks what are the causes of the evil condition of Italy ; and he answers that they are primarily four in number—viz. disunion, disorder, defencelessness, and consequently devastation by hordes of foreigners—French, Spanish, German, and Swiss. He next proceeds to consider remedies for this deplorable state of affairs, and the two which he finds to be necessary and adequate are, first, the formation of a strong native militia, and, secondly, the construction of a powerful and united national State. But how, in Italy's distracted and degenerate condition, can these remedies be secured ? Only, he holds, by means of an autocratic, merciless, and entirely unscrupulous prince. His own sympathies are strongly republican, and he hopes that Italy, when united and peaceful, may become a republic. But he realizes that a republic is possible only when a people is, as the antique Romans were, pure and patriotic. For a people corrupt and factious as the sixteenth-century Italians, a tyrant is a painful, if temporary

necessity. What means must the prince employ in order to secure his end—viz. the unification of Italy, the formation of a native army, the expulsion of the foreign invaders, and the establishment of peace and prosperity? The end, he considers, is so great that the means is a matter of indifference. If he can accomplish his end by means usually counted moral, well and good. But he probably—almost certainly—cannot do so. In that case he must employ means—namely, remorseless terrorism and limitless deceit—usually counted immoral, and must do so without the slightest hesitation. That is the essence of Machiavellism. It is the divorce of politics from ethics. It is the doctrine that the end justifies the means.

§ 2. *Calvinists and Jesuits*

Before the time when Machiavelli, through the careful application of his peculiar political principles to his private affairs, terminated his career in exile, poverty, and disgrace, the Reformation had broken out, and had destroyed once and for all the impressive unity of the mediæval *Respublica Christiana*. Though, no

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doubt, the religious aspect of the Reformation was the most prominent one, nevertheless, it had important political, social, and economic features. It was to no small extent the revolt of the Teuton against Latin domination ; the rising of the National-State against external control ; the attack of the laity upon ecclesiastical property ; the rebellion of the oppressed against their oppressors ; the defiance by the individual of authority. Consequently it gave rise to some political problems of the first magnitude. In particular, it revived in a new form the mediæval question of the relation of the "two powers"—the two powers concerned being now definitely "Church" and "State." Further, it raised in a most urgent manner the thorny and complicated problem of religious toleration. From the date of the edict of Theodosius I. referred to above (A.D. 392), through all the Middle Ages, citizenship and Church-membership had been synonymous. Heresy and treason had been one and the same thing. What in the present day would be regarded as religious persecution had seemed to be merely the necessary maintenance of the divinely ordained constitution of Christendom. But now the constitution of Christendom was irremediably shattered, and

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heresy began to receive as many novel connotations as there were novel sects. What was to be the attitude of kings towards the religious opinions of their subjects? What was to be the attitude of reformers towards the power and authority of kings? Such were the problems raised by the Reformation.

Martin Luther (A.D. 1483-1546), the pioneer of the new movement—perhaps because he found in his prince, Frederick of Saxony, his prime protector against imperial bans and papal bulls—showed himself to be a strong monarchist and an emphatic maintainer of the duty of obedience on the part of subjects to their ruler. He exalted the State, accepted the principle of the governmental regulation of religion, and, in short, laid the foundation of that German cult of *étatisme* which attained to its fullest expression in the writings of Hegel and of Treitschke. Nevertheless, he had to face the possibility that a prince might not be so good and useful as Frederick the Wise; that he might, indeed, be a persecutor. Hence he felt compelled (1) to urge the prince not to meddle unduly in ecclesiastical affairs, but to recognize a separation of spheres between the sacred and the secular; and (2) to maintain that, in the last resort, if a

prince persisted in error and in wrong-doing, the subject had—not so much a right as—a duty to resist and to refuse obedience. The “right of rebellion,” indeed, was inherent in the Reformation; and no reformer, however anxious he might be to support the secular power, could possibly escape from admitting it. The distinction between Church and State had once again been definitely established, and the great command “Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” had re-acquired a meaning that none could fail to recognize.

John Calvin (A.D. 1509–1564) was as eager as Luther to maintain order, enforce obedience, suppress heresy, and establish authority. He had a very different idea, however, from that of Luther respecting both the constitution of the State and the relation of the two powers. Adopting what was substantially the political doctrine of the great mediæval Papalists from St. Bernard to St. Thomas Aquinas, he maintained the supremacy of the spiritual power over the secular; of the Church over the State. Kings, princes, and governors were but the mundane arm of the Heavenly Majesty. But, further, the monarchical form of government did not appear

to him to be the best. He entirely concurred with what Luther, in an unguarded moment of irritation, had said—viz. that princes are commonly “die grösten narren oder die ergisten buben auf erden”—(*i.e.* “the greatest fools or the worst knaves on earth”). He considered that a republican Government, composed of the elders of the Church, was the one which approached nearest to the ideal. If such a Government could be established, no resistance to it would be tolerable. Even Calvin, however, in the closing pages of his *Institutes* has to allow, evidently with much reluctance, that under less perfect forms of administration, resistance may be justifiable and indeed necessary. If a ruler is a “tyrant” he may be resisted by the “ephors”—*i.e.* by recognized and responsible constitutional authorities in the State; if he is “wicked” (and who shall define wickedness?) he may be lawfully resisted by all. Here was a sluice through which the floods of rebellion were able to pass and to deluge the Continent of Europe.

The followers of Calvin—and, in particular, the Frenchman, Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, in his *Vindiciæ contra Tyrannos* * (A.D. 1579), and

* The authorship of the *Vindiciæ* has been long in dispute. In the eighteenth century it was confidently attrib-

the Scotsman, George Buchanan, in his *De Jure Regni apud Scotos* (A.D. 1579)—developed and expanded the slender "right of rebellion" recognized in the *Institutes* until it became the keynote of their political philosophy. Their emphasis on the right of rebellion was, of course, due to the sanguinary persecutions which Calvinism had suffered under such rulers as Mary Tudor of England, Mary of Guise in Scotland, Philip II. of Spain, and Charles IX. of France. In particular the massacre of the French Huguenots on St. Bartholomew's Day, A.D. 1572, was the cause of an immense outflow of anti-monarchical literature.

Calvinists, however, were not the only devout disturbers of monarchical tranquillity who suffered persecution in the closing years of the sixteenth century. In Protestant countries the newly instituted Order of Jesuits was active in encouraging fidelity to Catholicism and resistance to the commands of heretical kings. Hence it fell heavily under the displeasure of Protestant rulers, and suffered a severe repression. As a consequence, Jesuit theologians—such as Hubert Languet (1518–81), councillor to the Elector of Saxony. It is interesting to note that critical opinion is tending to come round to him again. Cf. Barker, E., in *Camb. Hist. Journal*, Vol. iii., No. 2 (October 1930).

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Juan de Mariana in his *De Rege et Regis Institutione* (A.D. 1599)—went even further than Calvinistic publicists in defending the right of resistance and in advocating tyrannicide. They developed, too, an interesting and important theory of the State. They denied to it any divine authority ; proclaimed it to be a merely secular institution, wholly inferior to the Church ; they assigned to it a purely human origin in convention or contract ; they taught that the people were the source of governmental authority.

§ 3. *The Monarchists*

The anti-tyrannical doctrines of the Calvinists and the Jesuits caused much perturbation in royal and constitutional breasts. Still more alarming were the rebellions and assassinations to which the application of the doctrines of the pious zealots led. Every prominent politician at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, went about in perpetual peril of violent death. William of Orange had survived five attempts upon his life before he fell in 1584 to the pistol of Balthazar Gerard ; Elizabeth of England told a French

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ambassador that she had captured no fewer than fifteen emissaries of Philip II. of Spain, who had confessed that their mission was her murder ; Henry IV. of France had survived nineteen actual attacks before he perished in 1610 beneath the dagger of Ravillac. The massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day was celebrated with a *Te Deum* and a medal by the thankful and elated Pope, and was the subject of the warmest congratulations on the part of the King of Spain. The extinction of the House of Valois by Clément's treacherous murder of Henry III. (A.D. 1589) was applauded by Sixtus V., and was defended by a number of eminent Catholic theologians. Similar pæans and plaudits from the Calvinistic side had greeted the murders of Cardinal Beaton in Scotland, and the Duke of Guise in France ; while the horrid deeds had been openly condoned by men so noted for piety as John Knox and Theodore Beza.

This deplorable state of things—in which the body politic was being destroyed by raging religious sects, and in which the most abominable and anti-social crimes were being perpetrated by devout demoniacs, and defended by the official heads of the Churches—caused, on the one hand, the formation of parties of *politiques*

pledged to the restoration of religious peace on the basis of toleration ; and, on the other hand, to the formulation of political principles consonant with the urgent needs of the times.

Jean Bodin (A.D. 1530–1596) was the pioneer exponent of the principles of the *politiques*. A Frenchman, who had escaped death on St. Bartholomew's Day only by exceptional agility and almost miraculous good luck, he was profoundly impressed by the undesirability of excessive zeal in religion. In a book entitled *Heptaplomeres* he powerfully argued—purely on the grounds of expediency and in the interests of the State—for a policy of toleration. In another and most enormous work, *Les Six Livres de la République* (A.D. 1576)—the most complete and systematic treatise on politics written since the time of Aristotle—he propounded the doctrine of State-sovereignty, denounced the pretended rights of resistance and rebellion, formulated the theory of positive and authoritative law, and proclaimed the subordination of the ecclesiastical to the secular power as it had never been proclaimed since Marsiglio had issued his *Defensor Pacis* two and a half centuries before. It was a book that had a profound influence on all subsequent political thought.

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Bodin, however, was too much of a rationalist and a free-thinker to please every one, even within the limits of the groups of moderates for whom he wrote. In particular, he spoke too much of the State and too little of the King ; too much of the wrong of rebellion and not enough of the sin of tyrannicide ; too much of politics and insufficiently of religion. Hence another school of thinkers adopted, developed, and applied the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. This doctrine had been originally formulated in a rudimentary way in the Middle Ages during the controversies between the Popes and the Emperors. The imperial advocates, as, for example, Dante, had contended that Cæsar derived his authority direct from God. The idea was now seized upon and expanded by national kings and their defenders, until in its final form it comprised the following five principles : (1) Monarchy is an institution divinely ordained ; (2) its source and model is the patriarchal administration as described in the Old Testament ; (3) its title is transmitted by primogeniture ; (4) monarchs who possess this hereditary divine right are responsible for their conduct as rulers to God alone ; and, therefore, (5) the duty of subjects is complete and un-

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questioning obedience in all circumstances. Prominent among the apostles of this absolutist creed were William Barclay, a Scotsman domiciled as a professor of law in France, who set it forth in his *De Regno et Regali Potestate* (A.D. 1600) ; and James I., another Scotsman domiciled in England as king, who propounded it in its extremest form in his *True Law of Free Monarchies*, his *Defence of the Right of Kings*, and other miscellaneous writings and speeches. Later in the seventeenth century it was expressed in a modified and rationalized form in Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha* (written A.D. 1642, but not published till A.D. 1680), a feeble work which would long ago have perished if only John Locke had not immortalized it by slaying it.

Not all royalists were able to swallow and digest the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings. It required a too great effort of faith to believe that all legitimate monarchs were lineal descendants of Abraham ; and that all valid political authority in the world was derived from the Old Testament patriarchs. Among those who were constrained to reject this theory was Thomas Hobbes, the Malmesbury philosopher (A.D. 1588-1679). Yet he was as anxious as James I. himself to maintain the authority of the State ;

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to assert the supremacy of positive law ; and to denounce the so-called "right of resistance." Profoundly disquieted by the English civil war, and exceedingly alarmed respecting his personal safety by the proximity of the fighting, he withdrew to Paris, and there wrote his famous *Leviathan* (A.D. 1651), a copy of which he was privileged to present to the fugitive Charles II. In this great work he emphasizes and elaborates Bodin's doctrine of State Sovereignty (the origin of which he ascribes to an irrevocable social contract) ; clarifies and enlarges Bodin's conception of law (making civil law, the command of the sovereign, superior to all other laws, natural or divine) ; and vehemently contends for the complete subordination of the Church to the secular authority.

CHAPTER VI

THE AGE OF REASON

§ I. *The Constitutionalists*

THE publication of Hobbes's *Leviathan* in A.D. 1651 gave rise among the English in Paris to such a storm of denunciation and objugation that the agitated philosopher fled in terror from France back to England, feeling that even the tender mercies of Cromwell and the Puritan army would be less menacing than the indignations of the exiled companions of Charles II. The royalist clergy, in particular, were wild with horror, not only at Hobbes's contemptuous rejection of the Divine Right of Kings, but also at his general scepticism, his avowed materialism, and his extreme and insolent Erastianism. Royalists who were not ecclesiastically minded were almost equally perturbed by a doctrine of State sovereignty which accorded equally

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well with republicanism as with monarchy ; which could be used with as much effect to condemn resistance to Cromwell as to the House of Stewart ; which supported, indeed, any ruler *de facto* without the slightest regard as to whether or not he were a king *de jure*. When Hobbes reached England he found that his work was not looked upon with any more approval by the republicans than it had been in France by the royalists. Those among them who were politicians resented his employment of their favourite dogma of the social contract as a prop for absolutism ; those who were jurists repudiated his theories of sovereignty and law ; those who were historians denied the accuracy of his picture of man in the State of Nature ; those who were philosophers rejected his psychology. Everywhere he found himself regarded with disapproval and dislike—a condition of things which caused him acute anxiety and alarm.

It was easier, however, to dislike Hobbes than to refute him. Few thinkers have had a more magnificent logical equipment than he. Granted his premises, his argument is as nearly flawless as human dialectic can make it. The two writers who dealt with him most effectively—

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both of them philosophers of the first rank—were Benedict Spinoza (A.D. 1632–1677) and John Locke (A.D. 1632–1704), and neither of these attempted to question his main conclusions, but, accepting them, were content to modify their applications to practical politics.

Spinoza, in especial, may be regarded as a disciple of Hobbes. His *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (A.D. 1670) and his posthumous *Tractatus Politicus* (A.D. 1677) follow with amazing closeness and fidelity the course of the argument of the *Leviathan*. Starting, however, with a less pessimistic view of both Nature and man than did Hobbes, Spinoza is able to introduce qualifications at every stage of the logical process, and to end up with a State which is constitutional, republican, tolerant in religion, and compatible with individual freedom.

John Locke, the apologist for the English Revolution of 1688, starting from positions even more widely removed than Spinoza's from those of Hobbes, developed a theory of limited monarchy which dominated the eighteenth century, and had the most profound effect upon the political thought of both the old world and the new. The influence of Locke can be traced through the writings of Molyneux,

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Montesquieu, Rousseau, Blackstone, and the American Federalists, right down to the present day. Not that Locke was, or professed to be, the originator of all the ideas with which he is specially associated. He had behind him in England an old tradition of constitutional theory as well as of parliamentary practice. He owed much to the judicious Hooker (A.D. 1554-1600) and the injudicious Sidney (A.D. 1622-1683), with whose works it is, unfortunately, impossible for us to deal in our limited space. But he welded his miscellaneous material into a magnificent armoury of constitutional principle. The first of his *Two Treatises on Civil Government* (A.D. 1690) is concerned, as we have seen, merely in clearing Filmer and the obsolete doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings out of the way. In the second of the two, Locke turns to the really serious business of dealing with Hobbes and his doctrine of sovereignty. Curiously enough, in the course of a long argument he manages to avoid all specific mention of either Hobbes or sovereignty. All the same, he effectively modifies Hobbes, and mitigates the asperities of sovereignty. Starting from a much more amiable conception of primitive man than Hobbes, or even Spinoza, he depicts the original

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State of Nature as sociable and happy, although undeveloped and incomplete ; he shows the causes which made the institution of the State desirable, and attributes the actual foundation of the State to a social contract between members of the primitive community, followed by a revocable governmental contract between the community as a whole and the ruler whom it selects as its chief. He contends that the community does not surrender all its natural rights to the government which it sets up, but merely those necessary for communal existence, and maintains that the sole purpose of the State is the protection of the individual's remaining natural rights, and particularly his natural rights to life, to liberty, and to property. Since he thus restricts the sphere of government, he has no difficulty in arguing, as he does at length in his *Letters on Toleration*, that the State has no concern whatsoever with religion, and that it should tolerate all forms of faith and worship which do not threaten the safety and well-being of civil society.

The arguments of Locke, and the constitutional practices of England which grew up in the early eighteenth century under the influence of Locke and his Whig disciples, had their off-

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shoot in France in the notable *Esprit des Lois* of the Baron de Montesquieu (A.D. 1689-1755). Montesquieu, visiting England about A.D. 1730, and remaining there some eighteen months, was deeply impressed by the contrast between the obscurantist autocracy of the French King, Louis XV., and the easy-going constitutionalism of George II. He examined the British system of government with great care, reinforced his investigations by means of extensive reading in history, and finally produced, in A.D. 1748, his *magnum opus*. It is divided into thirty-one books, and it contains in all 595 chapters. It covers a wide field of politics and law. Its obvious purpose, although its author is too prudent to mention it, is to commend to the French Government some modification of its oppressiveness by the adoption of a few of the constitutional practices of ancient Rome, mediæval Italy, and modern Britain. Its most notable addition to political ideas is its insistence on the importance (in the interests of individual liberty) of the separation of the three governmental powers embodied respectively in the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. It further revives the Polybian principle of checks and balances in the constitution. The work of

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Montesquieu had great influence in America at the time when the constitution of the United States was being framed (A.D. 1783-1789).

§ 2. *Revolutionaries*

The ideas of Locke, which in the mind of Montesquieu generated thoughts of mild constitutional reform, in the alert but unbalanced mind of Rousseau (A.D. 1712-1778) generated dreams of social and political revolution. Born in Geneva, the son of a mad watchmaker, Rousseau at the age of sixteen began a life of wandering and exile which (save for a dozen consecutive years in Paris, A.D. 1744-1756) terminated only with his death. He found that he had a natural gift for writing, when, in A.D. 1750, he won a prize offered by the Academy of Dijon for an essay on the moral effects of the arts and sciences. He continued his writing with a growing popularity until, in A.D. 1762, he captured the world with his inimitable *Contrat Social ou Principes du Droit Politique*. Rousseau's great book is marked by lucid and epigrammatic style, plausible and intelligible argument, intense emotion, and strong appeal to the passions of the

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multitude. It is inspired by two ideas which, until Rousseau wrote this work, had been regarded as incompatible with one another—viz. on the one hand, a consciousness of community as keen as Plato's, and, on the other hand, a passion for individual liberty even more consuming than Locke's. How is it possible to combine the sovereignty of the State with the freedom of the subject? That is the problem which Rousseau sets himself to solve. He solves it (or, at any rate, thinks he solves it) by postulating a community freely established by means of a voluntary compact entered into by men enjoying the liberty of the primitive State of Nature; and by supposing that in a community thus spontaneously generated the individual is so completely identified with the whole of which he forms a part that there is no conflict whatsoever between his personal will and the general will of the community. The terms of the social compact as he states them are: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and in our corporate capacity we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." The "general will" of Rousseau is Hobbes's *Leviathan* with his head chopped off. What will

happen, asks Rousseau, if, through some perversity of human nature the individual should manifest "a particular will contrary or dissimilar to the general will"? In that case, says Rousseau, he will be coerced. What, then, becomes of his primitive and inalienable liberty? It remains undiminished, says Rousseau; the man's perversity simply shows that he does not know what his real will is; coercion is in accordance with his real will; the community in coercing him is merely forcing him to be free! Thus the headless Leviathan of Rousseau is as formidable as the complete monster of Hobbes. Being forced to be free is, in effect, identical with being compelled to obey. Rousseau's problem is unsolved.

If, however, Rousseau fails to solve the problem with which he set out to deal, he succeeds, in the course of his discussion, in making contributions to political theory of permanent and inestimable value. He displays the people as the ultimate source of political authority; he proclaims the common good to be the proper end of government; he stresses the view that the State is a social organism; he develops the idea that, as an organism, it has a communal conscience and a general will; he maintains the

democratic doctrine that the true basis of political obligation is consent ; he proclaims the possibility of the ultimate reconciliation of freedom and authority. Although in the course of his meanderings he gives utterance to much wordy nonsense, the importance of his saner principles is such that he takes a high place among political idealists.

Rousseau's eloquence and enthusiasm won for him many disciples, and there can be no doubt that his ideas were among the contributory causes of the French Revolution. Just as Montesquieu undermined the foundations of the political autocracy of the Bourbons, and just as Voltaire sapped the strength of the corrupt and reactionary Gallican Church, so did Rousseau destroy the moral and intellectual bases of the iniquitous French social system. When the Revolution broke out (A.D. 1789), the principles of the *Contrat Social* were proclaimed by countless agitators in an orgy of political oratory—the ideas of the equality of men, the sovereignty of the people, the rightness of the general will, became the commonplaces of the forum.

Not only in France, moreover, were the principles of Rousseau proclaimed. They made disciples in many nations. It must suffice to here

mention two of the more eminent. In England and in America, Thomas Paine (A.D. 1737-1809) became the chief exponent of the Genevan gospel. An intense individualist, and by instinct an agitator, Paine, after a stormy career in England, crossed to America, and, by means of his *Common Sense* (A.D. 1776) and other works, did more than any other individual writer to stiffen the American resistance to Britain's claims, and to promote the assertion of American independence. Having returned to England in A.D. 1787, he watched with passionate interest and keen approval the course of the French Revolution from A.D. 1789 to 1792. When Edmund Burke denounced the Revolution in his famous *Reflections* (A.D. 1790), he replied in a fiery treatise which constitutes his most systematic and important contribution to political literature—viz. his *Rights of Man* (A.D. 1791-1792). Immediately after the publication of this work, fearing prosecution for treason, he crossed to France and found himself elected as a member of the Republican Convention. For ten years he remained in France, with many vicissitudes of fortune, and then recrossed the Atlantic to end his days in New York. He had less sense of community than Rousseau, and he consequently

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stressed the individualistic rather than the socialistic side of his master's teaching. But in a powerful manner he disseminated Rousseau's doctrines concerning the natural rights of man, social equality, the indefeasible sovereignty of the people, the obnoxiousness of unnecessary governmental interference with personal freedom.

In Germany the pre-eminent philosopher, Immanuel Kant (A.D. 1724-1804), with infinite patience, skill, and moderation, clarified the rhetoric of Rousseau, and worked the ideas of the *Contrat Social* into a coherent and self-consistent scheme. He did much, moreover, to co-ordinate and harmonize Rousseau's ideas with the principles of Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*. In the sphere of political theory his most important work is his *Philosophy of Law* (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre*), 1797. His definitions and examinations of such terms as "law" and "liberty" are invaluable.

§ 3. Reformers

It is strange to find Immanuel Kant classed with revolutionaries. No one could have been

milder than he, and nothing could have appeared less subversive than his placid life (wholly spent in his native Königsberg) or his sublime philosophy. He was even morbidly anxious to avoid giving offence to the powers that be. So far did he go in his efforts to conciliate Prussian prejudices that he tried to show (and therefore to believe) that the sovereignty of the people was not incompatible with the Hohenzollern monarchy ! But revolution does not necessarily connote violence, and revolutionary thought may be (though it rarely is) couched in language entirely free from passion. And there can be no question that Kant's conception of the supremacy of the moral law, his idealism, his cosmopolitanism, his humanitarianism, his pacificism, were radically incompatible with the belligerent nationalism of his day. He formulated the principles of a higher social order whose realization would imply a moral revolution.

He had contemporaries, however, whose ideas did not go so far as his in the direction of change. They were reformers who perceived the urgent need for improvement both in political institutions and in social conditions ; but they considered that these necessary ameliorations could be effected within the limits of the existing order.

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They were, of course, mainly British subjects ; for Britons are specialists in compromise, and in the capacity to escape from the logical consequences of their convictions. Three of these reformers, in particular, must be noted—viz. Edmund Burke, William Godwin, and Jeremy Bentham.

Edmund Burke (A.D. 1729–1797) was a Protestant Irishman of immense erudition and ability, destined originally for the law, but diverted therefrom to literature and politics. He became a Member of Parliament and secretary to a Whig Prime Minister, and he served as an invaluable storehouse of brains both to his chief and to his party. He was a practical statesman rather than a political theorist. He wrote on the urgent problems of the day when and as they arose. But he had an amazing faculty for penetrating beneath the surface of things, and for seeing below the temporary expedients and the shifty arguments of the politician the eternal truths of the philosopher. He never rested until he had discovered the fundamental principles by means of which the particular proposals of his party could be justified. Hence his writings are more rich in practical guidance for men of affairs than those of any other political

thinker. Of all the problems with which he had to deal, the two most important were, first, the revolt of the American colonies (A.D. 1774-1776) and, secondly, the French Revolution (A.D. 1789-1796). The fact that he maintained the cause of the American rebels, but denounced the French revolutionists, gave rise to some astonishment, even in the breasts of those who knew him so well as did Charles James Fox (who by instinct supported any sort of rebellion or revolution anywhere). But Burke was wholly consistent; he made no change of principle. He held strongly, and held all the time, the view that the State is an organism, a living entity, having a continuous existence from remote antiquity, subject to growth, liable to decay, and even to death. From this view it followed, on the one hand, that there was need of a constant watchfulness of reform, in order that the organism might adapt itself to its changing environment; on the other hand, that there was need of resistance to revolutionary change, which would destroy continuity and so cause death. He therefore urged in A.D. 1774 that the reasonable demands of the Americans should be conceded so as to avoid the disruption of the British Empire and secure its develop-

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ment along constitutional lines, while in A.D. 1791 he vehemently condemned the French ideologues because, misled by the abstract theories of Rousseau, they were going about to destroy their glorious monarchy, uproot their ancient aristocracy, subvert their venerable Church, and break completely with all that linked them with the past.

William Godwin (A.D. 1756-1836) was a less sane and balanced reformer than Burke. In the early part of his life, by a series of curious stages, he passed from Toryism and Calvinism to Anarchism and Atheism. He then began the return journey, but had got no further back than Liberalism and Agnosticism when his course was cut short prematurely, at the age of eighty, by death. His one really important political treatise, *An Inquiry Concerning Political Justice*, was published during his anarchical prime (A.D. 1793). It is marked by a passionate individualism and an intense enthusiasm for personal freedom, based on a profound belief that man is by nature good, and capable of attaining to perfection, if only he is not interfered with and subjected to external restraint. He therefore urged that Government should cease from its meddlings and should allow

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Society to reorganize itself on a voluntary basis ; that the Church should be disestablished ; that education should be dissociated from the State ; that punishment should give place to persuasion ; that free unions should supplant marriage ; that oaths and contracts should be abolished ; and that property should be redistributed, each person receiving according to his needs. Godwin's is the most extreme statement of individualism and *laissez-faire* that political literature possesses.

Jeremy Bentham (A.D. 1748-1832) was another political reformer, the great length of whose exceedingly inoffensive career excellently illustrates the ancient proverb that "whom the gods love die young." He wrote incessantly for more than sixty years ; he left some eighty works in print, together with 155 parcels of manuscripts which still (in the vaults of University College, London) await publication or incineration. Politically his two outstanding books are his *Fragments on Government* (A.D. 1776) and his *Theory of Morals and Legislation* (A.D. 1789). He is famous, first, for his elaborate reformulation of the antiquated utilitarian principle in ethics, and, secondly, for its entirely illogical application to politics, in the maxim that the supreme end

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and object of government ought to be to secure the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Although no sound dialectic can bridge the gulf which separates the "is" of Bentham's individualistic ethics from the "ought to be" of his communal politics, there can be no doubt that for British progressives, who can leap over logical abysses without noticing them, Bentham's formula was an invaluable touchstone of reform. The test of the "greatest happiness" principle enabled the Philosophical Radicals of the early nineteenth century to carry through a multitude of much-needed reforms—electoral, parliamentary, constitutional, and legal.

CHAPTER VII

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

§ 1. *Individualists*

DURING the first half of the nineteenth century individualism in one form or other was the dominant political principle of the Western world.

On the Continent the prevailing type was the revolutionary individualism of Rousseau, whether as exemplified by the Girondists and the Jacobins, or as tamed and humanized by Kant and by Fichte in the first stage of his philosophical pilgrimage. In its milder manifestation it was admirably displayed by the great Wilhelm von Humboldt (A.D. 1769-1835) in his short but remarkable book on *The Limits of State Activity*, in which he treated government as a necessary evil, urged that its functions should be restricted to the mere protection of life and

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property, and contended that the unfettered freedom of the individual in both speech and action was the indispensable condition of human progress. In England, too, this same anarchic individualism, in its more violent Jacobin shape, had some vogue. The works of Thomas Paine were frequently reprinted, were widely read, and were regarded as the gospel of advanced British Radicalism. Richard Carlile (A.D. 1790-1843) made it the business of his very active life to disseminate the doctrines of Paine, and his journal, *The Republican* (A.D. 1819 *et seq.*), enjoyed an extensive popularity until it attracted the attention of the public prosecutor. The energetic Major John Cartwright (A.D. 1740-1824) also was an avowed and zealous disciple of Rousseau, and he continued to preach the dogma of the "rights of man" long after Bentham had proclaimed it to be an "anarchic fallacy."

In England, however, the prevailing type of individualism was the reforming utilitarianism of Bentham, and of the powerful school of Philosophical Radicals which derived from Bentham. It was an individualism entirely explicable as a reaction from the excessive and disastrous governmental "inference" which

had characterized the eighteenth century—unintelligent interference disastrous to the common weal; corrupt interference in the interests of privileged classes and favoured persons; persecuting interference in religion; mercantile interference in commerce; anti-labour interference in industry; tyrannical interference both at home and in the overseas dominions. The cry of *laissez-faire, laissez-aller*, raised in France by the physiocrats, was caught up in England by nonconformists like Godwin, by economists like Adam Smith, by champions of labour like Francis Place, and by political reformers like Bentham and his disciples. It was the dominant cry until the early days of Queen Victoria, and it was a cry that was of a potency scarcely to be overestimated in rousing the Radicals to secure the abolition of countless hoary iniquities and antiquated imbecilities.

Of all the disciples of Bentham, the first and most faithful was James Mill (A.D. 1773–1836). His main function in life was to translate Bentham into English, and so to render intelligible to the average British mind the complexities and prolixities of his indescribable and intolerable jargon. He added little to his master's creed, except to strengthen its psychological founda-

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tions. He held, with Hobbes, that man is an entirely selfish animal whose main characteristics are love of liberty and lust for power. He argued, therefore, that, if this self-regarding individual assisted in founding a State and setting up a government, he did so for purely personal and utilitarian ends, these ends being the defence of his own life, liberty, and property. He further maintained that all persons entrusted with governmental authority, by reason of their human nature, would inevitably lust for more power, and would endeavour to encroach on the liberties of their subjects. He consequently urged upon his fellow-citizens the need of eternal vigilance, and advised them to curb the might of the executive by means of a single-chamber representative system marked by a wide suffrage, frequent elections, and vote by ballot.

James Mill was a hard man and a sternly logical thinker. Much more humane and muddle-headed was his son, John Stuart Mill (A.D. 1806-1873). He had naturally a quick and eager intelligence, but it was crushed in infancy by excessive education. It remained receptive, but ceased to be creative or even co-ordinative. It absorbed, first, the utilitarianism of Bentham,

and James Mill ; secondly, the romanticism of Coleridge ; thirdly, the idealism of Carlyle ; fourthly, the positivism of Comte ; fifthly, the feminism of Mrs. Taylor ; and, finally, the semi-socialism of Saint-Simon. The result was chaos. Mill became a utilitarian who admitted qualitative as well as quantitative distinctions in pleasures ; an empiricist who felt the force of intuitions ; a realist inspired by a lofty idealism ; an atheist with a strong sense of religion ; an individualist with a decided leaning towards socialism. Nevertheless, an individualist. The supreme passion of his rather phlegmatic nature—which Disraeli aptly compared with that of a “finishing governess”—was for personal freedom. His most notable work in the realm of political theory is undoubtedly his magnificent dissertation *On Liberty* (A.D. 1859). In this he pleads with convincing power for freedom of thought and discussion, and for freedom of action in so far as such freedom does not interfere with the equal freedom of others ; he emphasizes the inestimable worth of personality, and exalts self-realization (rather than happiness) as the final aim of existence ; finally, he sets rigid limits to the authority of the State over the individual. His second great work on politics

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is his *Representative Government* (A.D. 1861), in which he treats of the methods of democratic administration, and maintains that the educative value of a wide popular franchise is alone enough to make democracy preferable to any other form of rule.

While John Stuart Mill was trying to reconcile liberty with socialism, Herbert Spencer (A.D. 1820-1903) was vehemently contending that they were wholly incompatible with one another. In his *Social Statics* (A.D. 1851), and again in his *Man versus the State* (A.D. 1884), he was denouncing the sins of legislators; deploring the incessant encroachments of government; lamenting lost liberties; and urging the strict limitation of the functions of the State to the old bounds of the protection of the natural rights of the individual to life, liberty, and property. Professor Huxley happily described his friend Spencer's political system as "administrative nihilism."

§ 2. *Collectivists*

That antithesis of Man versus the State which Herbert Spencer depicted and accentuated was precisely the antithesis which Rousseau had so

deeply deplored and had striven so hard to resolve. It will be remembered that Rousseau's reconciliation of the apparent antagonism between the two had taken the form of the assertion of the existence of a general will in the community which was always identical with the real will of each individual constituting the community. This theory assumed an organic (as opposed to a mechanical) conception of the State ; and it attributed to the State a personality which connoted intelligence, conscience, and volition. Rousseau's brilliant idea captivated, as we have seen, the powerful and penetrating intellect of Kant, and he developed it into a general theory of law, in which he showed that law was not the antithesis but the indispensable condition of liberty. Liberty, the individualistic side of Rousseau's revolutionary teaching, was the central theme of Kant's political system.

Liberty, too, was the main preoccupation of J. G. Fichte (A.D. 1762-1814), Kant's ablest and most devoted disciple, during the first phase of his career—i.e. to A.D. 1799. He was a cosmopolitan who advocated individualism, asserted the sovereignty of the people, eulogized Rousseau, and welcomed the French Revolution. To this period of his life belong his *Französische Revo-*

lution (A.D. 1793) and his *Grundlage des Naturrechts* (A.D. 1796). The French invasions of Germany, however, and, in particular, the destruction of Prussian independence by the Battle of Jena, changed his attitude. His famous *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (A.D. 1807-1808) summoned his countrymen to combat and revenge. He became a nationalist and a political reactionary; he began to emphasize the solidarity of the community rather than the freedom of the individual; he commenced to assert the need of authority, the duty of obedience, the claims of military service, the nobility of sacrifice on behalf of the State, the desirability of high protective tariffs in order to develop all the resources of the community, the merits of collectivism. It would be difficult to imagine a more complete change of view than that which marked his *Geschlossene Handelsstaat* (A.D. 1800) and his *Staatslehre* (A.D. 1813), as compared with his earlier writings mentioned above. Nevertheless, with all his enormous tergiversations, he remained still a disciple of Rousseau (though hardly of Kant). He merely stressed the communal aspects of Rousseau's teaching—viz. the organic nature of the State; the authority of the community over the individual; the sovereignty

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of the general will. This, however, meant that, from being an individualist, he had become a collectivist.

The collectivism of Fichte was adopted and extensively elaborated by G. W. F. Hegel (A.D. 1770–1831), most influential of all nineteenth-century philosophers, successor to Fichte's chair in the University of Berlin. In his *Philosophie des Rechts* (A.D. 1821) and his posthumous *Philosophie der Geschichte* (A.D. 1832), he expounded and advocated a cult of the State which reduced the individual to complete subordination, and made him a mere means to a collective end. Hegel was an idealist who believed that the fundamental entity in the universe is spiritual—viz. a rational will; an evolutionist, before either Spencer or Darwin, who held that the course of history displays the perpetual development of this inherent and omnipotent volition; and an absolutist who taught that the universal method of evolutionary progress is the dialectical method of action and reaction between opposite and antagonistic principles, such as freedom and authority, law and liberty, despotism and democracy, stability and motion, life and death; and that the ultimate and Absolute Reality comprises all these apparent contradictions re-

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conciled and harmonized. In the sphere of political philosophy he maintained that Will (which is necessarily free) is the basis both of individual personality and of the State ; that this basal Will is realized and manifested, first, in objective law ; secondly, in subjective morality ; thirdly, in social ethics (*Sittlichkeit*), and, finally, in political ethics by the State. To him the State is the end of the evolutionary process of man's cultural development ; it is the Absolute in which is reconciled (as Rousseau had intuitively divined) the real will of each citizen and the general will of the community as a whole ; only in the State does the individual attain to full freedom—that true freedom which is both the development of faculty and the fulfilment of function. In Hegel political theory seems to have come in complete circle back to Plato.

The Hegelian theory had a strange and chequered history in the second half of the nineteenth century. When Treitschke identified the ideal and visionary State of Hegel with the Hohenzollern monarchy the way was made clear for Bismarck, Bernhardi, and the Great War. When Feuerbach and Karl Marx denied that the fundamental entity in the universe is

spiritual, and proclaimed it to be material, they paved the path to Communism and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. When, in England, Thomas Hill Green and his disciples in Oxford added the yeast of the Hegelian *Staatslehre* to the mixture of Plato and Aristotle, Kant and Fichte, Carlyle and Maurice, which was already working in that ancient seat of learning, it produced a ferment of collectivism out of which ultimately was brewed the small beer of Fabian Socialism.

Thomas Hill Green (A.D. 1836-1882), however, must not be dismissed in a single sentence. He was a great and noble man, though not a thinker of the first rank, and lacking in lucidity as a writer ; the sort of man in whom good German philosophers are reincarnated after they are dead. In his *Prolegomena to Ethics* and his *Principles of Political Obligation* (both posthumous, A.D. 1885-1888) he combated the materialism of Hume, the utilitarianism of Bentham, the individualism of Spencer, and the positivism of G. H. Lewes ; maintaining that man is a spiritual being of infinite value and limitless possibilities ; that freedom is essential for his full development ; that only in the State can he find the conditions of this freedom ; and that the supreme function

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of the State is to remove the hindrances which prevent the realization of the good life on the part of the individual citizens. Kant rather than Hegel is assuredly the dominant note in Green's political philosophy.

§ 3. *Socialists*

Side by side with the great current of individualism which, as we have seen, flowed full and strong in the first half of the nineteenth century, three small streams of Socialism began to display themselves, ultimately destined to unite in the tremendous torrent of Marxian Communism.

The first was French, and it had its source in the inexhaustible springs of Rousseau, who had taught (*inter alia*) that in the original condition of nature all men were free and equal ; that they had all things in common, each individual drawing on the general store according to his need ; and that the fall of man from felicity and innocence was due to the institution of private property. The Communism of Rousseau was developed by Morelly in his *Code de la Nature* (A.D. 1755) and by Mably in his *Principes des Lois* (A.D. 1776) ; moreover, during the Revolution

an attempt was made by Babœuf (A.D. 1796) to put it into practice. But the French Revolution was primarily an individualistic movement—a rising on behalf of liberty rather than equality. Hence Communism was submerged for a time. After the Revolution was over, however, it re-emerged, in an exceedingly mild and amiable form, in the writings of the Comte de Saint-Simon (A.D. 1760–1825), who taught that, in the interests of the poor, land and capital and all the instruments of production should be common property; that every one should work according to his capacity, and should be rewarded in proportion to his services. At the same time F. C. M. Fourier (A.D. 1772–1837) formulated a scheme for the complete reorganization of the human race by means of the institution of “phalansteries,” each consisting of 500 families, and each constituting a self-sufficing communistic unit. Further, P. J. Proudhon (A.D. 1809–1865) vehemently attacked both private property and government (which, he said, owed its existence to the institution of private property) and declared that labour is the sole source and measure of value. Finally, Louis Blanc (A.D. 1811–1882) drew up an elaborate scheme for the organization of labour on Guild Socialist lines.

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The second stream of Socialist tendency rose in England. It had its source far back in the fulminations of John Ball ; in the fantasies of such books as More's *Utopia* and Harrington's *Oceana* ; in the writings and experiments of such seventeenth-century Communists as Everard and Winstanley ; and in the eighteenth-century speculations of such thinkers as William Ogilvie and Thomas Spence—not to mention again Thomas Paine and William Godwin, who, from the midst of their individualism, let loose some strangely incongruous communistic ideas. The nineteenth century, however, saw in its opening decades the complete formulation of an advanced socialistic programme at the hands of six notable men, for details of whose lives and works I must refer my readers to Professor Foxwell's edition of A. Menger's *Right to the Whole Produce of Labour* (A.D. 1899) and M. Beer's *History of British Socialism* (A.D. 1919-1920). The names of the men were Charles Hall, Robert Owen, William Thompson, Thomas Hodgskin, John Gray, John Francis Bray. Between them they did not leave many economic errors for Karl Marx to invent, or mare's nests for him to discover. Further, it may be noted, there was a strong communistic element in Chartism (A.D.

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1837-1848); while the so-called Christian Socialism of Ludlow, Maurice, and Kingsley at least perpetuated the name for a few years (A.D. 1848-1854), although it was Co-operation rather than Socialism which it advocated and fostered.

The third and last stream of socialist tendency rose in Germany, where it had its source in the Hegelian philosophy of the State, and therefore ultimately in Rousseau. The pioneers of German Socialism were (1) "Karl Marlo" (Professor Winkelblech, A.D. 1800-1859), who saw a remedy for the economic evils of his age in collective property, co-operative production, communal distribution, and control of population; (2) K. J. Rodbertus (A.D. 1805-1875), who developed and emphasized the labour theory of value, proclaimed the iniquity of both interest on capital and rent of land, and sketched the outline of a future, though distant, communistic national State in which all would be equal, and each would be rewarded according to his social service; (3) Ferdinand Lassalle (A.D. 1825-1864), who, though adding little to the doctrines which he learned from Proudhon, Blanc, Marlo, and Rodbertus, disseminated Socialism by means of a marvellous eloquence and a fiery enthusiasm; and established German

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Social Democracy by his organization of the Working Men's Association in 1863.

All the three streams of Socialist tendency met and mingled in the Communism of Karl Marx (A.D. 1818-1883). Marx—whose proper Hebrew name was Mordechia—was born in Trèves, and he imbibed the Hegelian philosophy at the Universities of Bonn and Berlin. After a short and troubled career as a revolutionary journalist, he fled to Paris, and there (A.D. 1843-1845), through association with Proudhon and other French Socialists, learned what they could teach him of the reorganization of the human race. Finally, after a sojourn in Belgium (A.D. 1845-1848) and a brief return to Germany (A.D. 1848), he moved to London, where he spent the remainder of his days (A.D. 1849-1883) in study, in writing, in organization, and in agitation—all with a view to the precipitation of the social revolution and the institution of the cosmopolitan communistic commonwealth. The social elements of his system were French; the economic English; the political German. The best and most effective statement of his ideas and his proposals is that given in the famous *Communist Manifesto* (A.D. 1848), drawn up by himself and his friend Engels as a sequel to a communist conference

held in London the previous year. His larger work on *Capital* (A.D. 1867-1894), a work written in scarcely intelligible phraseology, added nothing to the political theory implicit in the *Manifesto*.

The Marxian system consists of five items—viz. (1) a materialistic conception of history, according to which the evolution of mankind has been and is determined not by ideas but by bodily necessities ; (2) a theory of class war, by means of which the rise and fall of civilizations, the success and failure of states, and the vicissitudes of social orders are explained ; (3) a labour theory of value and of surplus value, which is supposed to account for and to justify the class war ; (4) a doctrine of economic determinism, according to which it is possible, in Marx's opinion, to predict the inevitable collapse of capitalist civilization and the establishment of the proletarian paradise ; and (5) an immediate communistic policy, so formulated as to hasten the inevitable and facilitate the evolution of inexorable fate.

CHAPTER VIII

THE AGE OF TRANSITION

§ 1. *Revisionists*

WHAT made the Marxian system formidable, and what made Marx a name to conjure with, was the establishment of the International Working Men's Association in London (A.D. 1864), and its capture by Marx, after a vain effort had been made by constitutional proletarians to exclude him as "bourgeois." The four great Continental conferences held by this Association successively at Geneva, Lausanne, Brussels, and Basle (A.D. 1866-1869) filled both Governments and industrial magnates of the world with alarm. For they breathed an energy of hatred, displayed a fervour of conviction, and suggested a possession of power, that seemed to threaten a speedy and sanguinary social revolution. More and more did Marx in person dominate these cosmopolitan assemblies (he

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could speak a larger number of the languages represented than could any other member), and more and more did the Marxian system become the accepted creed of the militant proletariat.

Three things, however, brought this "First International" to an end, and caused a serious set-back to the Marxian propaganda. They were : (1) internal revolt against the dictatorship of Marx ; (2) the Franco-Prussian War, which split the Association into violently antagonistic national groups ; and (3) scepticism concerning the validity of the Marxian system. The final explosion occurred in A.D. 1872, and the fragments which survived were swept away in the following year.

The term "revisionism" was the name given by the sceptics to what that orthodox Marxian, Karl Kautsky, rightly calls the "abandonment of the fundamental principles and conceptions of scientific Socialism." It was a term which concealed the magnitude of the gulf which divided the new Socialists from the old. The best statement of the revisionist case is given by the leader of the "Los-von-Marx" movement, Eduard Bernstein, in his *Evolutionary Socialism* (A.D. 1899). In this work he abandons the materialistic conception of history ; admits modifications of

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the doctrine of the class war ; rejects the labour theories of value and surplus value, in so far as they are supposed to have any relation to actual business life ; repudiates the dogma of economic determinism ; and, finally, propounds a policy of evolutionary reform as a substitute for the Marxian policy of a violent proletarian revolution.

Whilst " revisionism " was making its way in Germany, and was profoundly modifying the attitude of the Social Democratic party towards practical politics, a similar movement in England was leading to the establishment of the Fabian Society in A.D. 1884. Socialism in England had languished since the collapse of Chartism in A.D. 1848, and the euthanasia of Christian Co-operation in A.D. 1854. The following thirty years were to Britain years of unparalleled industrial and commercial prosperity, during which the prospect of revolution presented no attractions to the normal working man. In the eighties, however, prosperity began to decline : industry was hit by the new rivalry of Germany and the United States ; commerce was hampered by novel tariff walls ; above all, agriculture languished owing to the competition of the produce of the unexhausted soils of

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America and the British Dominions overseas. In these circumstances of growing adversity collectivism revived. On its intellectual and theoretical side it originated in the political philosophy of Thomas Hill Green. It was reinforced by the positivism, humanitarianism, and semi-socialism of the later writings of John Stuart Mill (especially his *Autobiography*, A.D. 1873). It took a definitely socialist turn when its pioneers took to reading Karl Marx's *Capital*.

The founders of the Fabian Society came to the conclusion that Marx's *Capital*, like the curate's egg, was good in parts, but only in parts. Hence they rejected some parts, modified others, and swallowed the remainder. To state the matter summarily, (1) they repudiated Marx's materialism and economic determinism, denounced his dogma of the class war, and denied the truth of his labour theory of value ; (2) they diverged from Marx in regarding the State as a permanent institution (the very basis of Socialism, indeed), and not a mere means to the proletarian dictatorship, to be discarded as soon as possible ; further, they diverged from him in preferring peaceful and constitutional evolution to violent revolution, and in anticipating a gradual amelioration of the lot of the work-

REVISIONISTS

ing classes rather than a progressive increase of their misery ; (3) they accepted, however, his doctrine of surplus value, with its implication of the exploitation of labour by capital ; they adopted his policy of the expropriation of the capitalist and the landlord, and they looked forward to the eventual reconstruction of society on a new basis. Hence they were more than Collectivists ; they were Socialists.

The policy of the Fabian Society displayed itself, first, in a process of sapping as distinct from assault—Socialism with its revolutionary ulterior aims being made to appear as really nothing more than Collectivism—*i.e.* a harmless extension of State action, such as was already seen in the State control of the Post Office ; secondly, in a steady extension of State and municipal enterprise into the sphere of production, to the elimination of private activity ; thirdly, in the rapid increase of State and municipal aid to infants and invalids, aged and unemployed, paupers and parasites ; finally, in the conversion of taxation from a painful necessity to a joyful opportunity of redistributing the national income in the interests of the proletariat.

The heyday of Fabian, or collectivist, Social-

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ism was the quarter century which ended with its production of the Minority Poor Law Report in A.D. 1909. From that date reaction against the cult of the State became conspicuous.

§ 2. *Anti-Collectivists*

During the quarter century A.D. 1884-1909 collectivism had many opportunities to manifest its efficiency. Bismarck in Germany, successive Prime Ministers in France, cabinets influenced by Fabianism in England, governments and municipalities widely throughout the world, extended the sphere of communal enterprise until it included railways, telegraphs, telephones, post offices, docks, harbours, gasworks, waterworks, and countless other productive enterprises. The net result of these numerous experiments made it appear to many sympathetic observers that the region within which public authorities were likely to conduct industrial undertakings to success was a strictly limited one. The working classes, moreover, who had expected greater freedom and better conditions under public than under private administration, were frequently disappointed and disgusted to find that

they had merely exchanged King Log for King Stork.

Hence a reaction against collectivism set in. Fabian Socialism began to be called "State Capitalism," and to be attacked by its quondam supporters as no better than Prussian tyranny, while those who continued to advocate it were denounced as "dotards" who might take their choice whether they would be called "knaves who hate freedom, or fools who do not know what freedom means." Now, freedom is the key-word of Individualism, while equality is the key-word of Socialism. This cry for freedom, therefore, indicates that a distinct movement backwards (or onwards) towards *laissez-faire* was beginning. At first, however, the movement went no further than a passionate demand for the freedom of industrial groups (not the freedom of individuals), and it manifested itself in France earlier than in England. This French movement received the name of syndicalism.

Syndicalism had its origin in France during the closing years of the nineteenth century. It arose as a spontaneous rank-and-file movement within the French trade unions (*syndicats*), and it signified, first, a revolt against the State and against political methods which in the then corrupt

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condition of French public life had conspicuously failed to deal honestly and adequately with the problems of labour ; secondly, a protest against the failure of Socialism to redeem its promises ; and, thirdly, an insurrection against bureaucratic tyranny in industry itself, and a demand for a return to more natural conditions of group autonomy.

The syndicalist idea involves the repudiation of the authority of the State, the repudiation of leadership, the repudiation of reason, the repudiation of restraint. In place of these it advocates violent revolution, spontaneous action by the rank and file, the creative evolution of unregulated instinct, and an unmitigated ferocity. It proclaims the class war in its extremest form, it adopts the general strike as its main weapon of offence, it projects the complete expropriation of the capitalist and the landlord, and it looks forward to the reorganization of society in the form of a federation of industrial unions. This last item on the syndicalist programme is the only one which distinguishes the syndicalist from the complete anarchist.

Syndicalism was not allowed to remain an unrealized idea. It captured the French *Confédération Générale du Travail* in 1902, and it

ANTI-COLLECTIVISTS

inspired its efforts to precipitate general strikes in France in 1906 and subsequent years ; its second great, though entirely unsuccessful, experiment was made in Sweden in 1909 ; about the same time it planted itself in England, where Mr. Tom Mann became its chief apostle, where it produced the great coal and railway strikes of 1911-1912, and where it finally found a congenial home in the executive of the Miners' Federation. It played a prominent part in the Russian Revolution of October 1917 ; it ravaged Italy until it was checked by Fascism in 1921 ; it still agitates America through the agency of the so-called Industrial Workers of the World.

The excessive antagonism of syndicalism to the State, and its total repudiation of politics in every shape or form, made, however, no general appeal anywhere outside France. In England, particularly, it found itself out of accord with the instincts and habits of the democratic working man, who valued his franchise and was accustomed to play his part in municipal and parliamentary elections. Consequently anti-collectivism in England, for the most part, took a less extreme shape than it did in France. The majority of the rebels against state socialism did

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not become syndicalists or anarchists, but merely "guildsmen." They called themselves "guild socialists" at first, but the name was designed solely to conceal the completeness of their revolt against the Fabianism which they were deserting. As a matter of fact, no gulf could well be wider than that which separates the Fabian State, which is to be the sole proprietor of land and capital, and the sole controller of production, distribution, and exchange, and the guildsmen's State, which is to be excluded from any participation in industry whatsoever.

The guildsmen envisage a dualistic polity—on the one hand, a producers' organization, *i.e.* a federation of national guilds or industrial trade unions, which shall have supreme and final authority over all matters appertaining to the economic concerns of the country; on the other hand, a consumers' organization, *i.e.* a State, a set of political institutions, which shall manage non-economic affairs. A number of ecclesiastics who resent the restraint which parliament puts upon their eccentricities ask that the Churches may be placed on an equal footing with the industrial guilds, and that a triple constitution—political, economic, religious—may be established. Similar demands will no doubt be made, as soon as

NEW INDIVIDUALISTS

guildism comes within the sphere of practical politics, by universities, schools, athletic societies, night clubs, and other organizations.

§ 3. *New Individualists*

Although Socialism is still strongly entrenched in labour parties and trade union executives, it is fighting a defensive battle in the open field of political philosophy. Its most formidable foes are those who have sprung up in its own midst. The disruption of the imposing Marxian structure has been due primarily to the underminings effected by the revisionists such as Eduard Bernstein in Germany, Deslinières in France, and Sidney Webb in England. The Fabian fabric has received its most damaging and most disrespectful blows, not from anti-socialists such as Mallock, but from syndicalists and guildsmen whom it has nourished in its own select nursery. Further, syndicalism and guildism themselves are to-day suffering a disintegration from the sappings of amiable anarchists whom they have trained all too successfully in the principles and practice of rebellion against every constituted authority. Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Principles of Reconstruction* (A.D. 1916), *Roads to Freedom*

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(A.D. 1918), and *Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (A.D. 1923), shows so intense an antipathy to any restraint upon his own creative impulses as to make it necessary for political theorists to classify him, with Tolstoy and Kropotkin, among the extreme section of anarchic individualists. Professor H. J. Laski in his *Problem of Sovereignty* (A.D. 1917), *Authority in the Modern State* (A.D. 1919), and *Grammar of Politics* (A.D. 1925), although he does not go so far as Mr. Russell, is, nevertheless, in the same eminent company. He denounces the doctrine of State sovereignty (developed by Bodin, Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin) as false in fact and contrary to individual right ; he proclaims the natural rights of the individual (denied by the Collectivists and the Socialists) to be a reality, although merely founded on experience and discovered inductively ; he considers the dispersion of coercive authority among various powers—political, industrial, and ecclesiastical—to be essential to the freedom of the individual ; and he regards the welfare of the individual as the sole criterion of the worth of any institution whatsoever. This doctrine is not strikingly dissimilar from that set forth in that advanced textbook of limitless liberty, Godwin's *Political Justice*.

NEW INDIVIDUALISTS

The new individualism, moreover, is not taught by those alone who have escaped from the meshes of socialism, syndicalism, and guildism, into the free places of innocent anarchism ; it is also taught by Liberals who maintain, in a modified form, the traditions of the philosophical radicalism of Bentham and the Mills. Their most erudite and eloquent spokesman is Professor L. T. Hobhouse, whose four notable books on the principles of sociology contain an admirable presentment of the case against the Hegelian cult of the State. They are *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (A.D. 1918), *The Rational Good* (A.D. 1921), *The Elements of Social Justice* (A.D. 1922), and *Social Development* (A.D. 1924). These books maintain that the individual alone possesses personality (*i.e.* they deny both State and group personality) ; they assert that the foundations of Society are ethical (*i.e.* they deny the non-moral or supra-moral character of the State) ; they set forth a conventional and mechanistic theory of the State (as opposed to the organic theory of the Hegelians) ; and they determine the functions of the State by the criterion of the common good, the main element in which is personal freedom.

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Personal freedom, once again, is the note struck in the new Conservatism of men like Lord Hugh Cecil in such works as his *Liberty and Authority* (A.D. 1910), *Conservatism* (A.D. 1912), and *Nationalism and Catholicism* (A.D. 1918). Just as the cry of Professor Laski is "Back to Godwin!" and Professor Hobhouse's cry "Back to Bentham!" so is Lord Hugh Cecil's cry "Back to Burke!" He emphasizes the religious basis of society and the State, stresses the sovereignty of the individual conscience, defends liberty and property as personal rights, and proclaims freedom to be essential for the development of individual character.

Hence on all sides at the present day is seen a revolt among the pioneers of political philosophy against the Collectivism and the Socialism of the latter half of the nineteenth century. What it will lead to is impossible to foresee. We can only hope that it will carry mankind one step forward along the path whose ultimate goal is the final solution of the æonian problem of political science—viz. the reconciliation of law and liberty, order and progress, authority and conscience, individual and community, Man and the State.

CHAPTER IX

THE PRESENT DAY

NINE years have elapsed since the preceding chapters were written. During that period an immense amount of work has been done on the history of political ideas. For never has there been a period in which there has been a more resounding conflict of principles, and never before has there been a more diligent searching of the armouries of past controversy in order to discover weapons for the waging of present battle. A whole "Library of Political Thought" covering the main ideas and movements from the Middle Ages down to our own time has been published by Messrs. Ernest Benn, under the editorship of Professor H. J. Laski, and it implies no disparagement of this valuable series to say that it is particularly full and complete on what may be called the progressive or re-

volutionary side of politics. A great deal of attention, moreover, has been paid to the comparatively unworked and unsurveyed field of mediæval political speculation. To begin with, Dr. A. J. Carlyle has finished a great six-volumed masterpiece on *Mediæval Political Theory in the West* (1903-36), and, although the appeal of the work is weakened by a defective arrangement and a heavy style, it contains masses of exact information not readily accessible elsewhere. Apart from this comprehensive survey, important monographs have appeared on the politics of (1) St. Augustine by Gustave Combès (1927), Viktor Stegemann (1928), E. Goller (1930), and Carl von Horn (1934); (2) John of Salisbury by J. Dickinson (1927), and C. C. J. Webb (1931); (3) St. Thomas Aquinas by Martin Grabmann (1928); and (4) Ægidius Romanus by R. Scholz (1929). Now all the mediæval thinkers re-examined in these scholarly works dealt in one way or another with that crucial problem of the *Respublica Christiana*—viz. the relation of the two powers, secular and ecclesiastical. And that problem is precisely the one which has been raised in a most acute form during the nine years just past. The persecution of the Orthodox Church in Soviet

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Russia ; the struggle for life and liberty on the part of both Catholics and Lutherans in Nazi Germany ; the scarcely-veiled conflict in Italy between the Papacy and essentially - pagan Fascism ; the controversy which has raged even in our own country concerning Parliament and the Prayer Book—all these things show that the arguments of Augustine, John of Salisbury, Aquinas, and Giles of Rome, have lost none of their relevance or their force. As we read the monographs of the modern scholars in which the mediæval theories are expounded we realize that the fundamental problems of politics are eternally the same, however completely circumstances may change.

Not less urgent than the problem of the relation of Church and State has been, and still is, the problem of the relative merits and demerits of Democracy and Dictatorship. The Great War, we are told, was fought "to make the world safe for Democracy," and when, one after another, the autocratic empires of Russia, Austria, and Germany fell, it seemed as though the purpose of the war would be fulfilled. Democratic constitutions, of one sort or another, were set up in every European State. But in all-too-many of the States in which it was

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established Democracy showed itself to be ineffective and unworkable. Hence, almost at once, the slump began which has continued down to the present day. Lenin in Russia (1917); Mussolini in Italy (1922); Primo de Rivera in Spain (1923); Mustapha Kemal in Turkey (1925); Pilsudski in Poland (1926); King Alexander in Jugo-Slavia (1929); Hitler in Germany, and Dolfuss in Austria (1933)—all of them overthrew corrupt and incompetent Democracies and established ruthless but efficient Dictatorships.

The problems raised by this long series of revolutions or counter-revolutions have naturally inspired a vast amount of theoretical discussion. Many works, of course, deal directly with the problems of the present. Excellent examples of these are J. S. Barnes's *Universal Aspects of Fascism* (1927); Hugh Sellon's *Democracy and Dictatorship* (1934); and R. Bassett's *Essentials of Parliamentary Democracy* (1935). But others—and it is with these that we are mainly concerned—treat of old political idealists whose writings have acquired a new significance because of their relevance to present-day affairs. Never has the amazing modernity of Marsiglio of Padua been made so evident as it is in the

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masterly treatises of C. W. Previté Orton (1928) and G. Lagarde (*La Naissance de l'Esprit Laïque au Déclin du Moyen Age*, 1934). Still more modern in his complete emancipation from the restraints of both morality and religion is Machiavelli, and it is not remarkable that the establishment of Fascism in Italy should have been accompanied by a vigorous revival of his cult, and by an intensive study of his works. Not only has a fine new edition of his complete writings been issued and widely circulated, but exhaustive expositions of his ideas have been made by Giuseppe Prezzolini (1927) and Ettore Janni (1930). In English, too, a new and important study of the life and works of the great Florentine has come from the pen of D. Erskine Muir (1936).

Other old political theorists whose writings are relevant to present-day problems, and concerning whom dissertations have been written during the past nine years, are (1) Rousseau—a never-failing source of fascination—respecting whom notable books have been produced by A. L. Sells (1929), C. E. Vulliamy (1931), A. Cobban (1934), and C. W. Hendel (1935); (2) Edmund Burke—Rousseau's great antagonist—whose life and works have been critically

examined by Bertram Newman (1927), A. Cobban (1929), and R. H. Murray (1931); (3) Thomas Paine—the chief of Rousseau's English exponents, and the most formidable of the assailants of Burke—who has been the subject of a careful and sympathetic study by Mary A. Best, while (4) his contemporary, the amiable anarchist William Godwin, has been treated anew by Ford K. Brown (1926). We still, however, await that great desideratum, a complete reprint of the first (1793) edition of Godwin's *Political Justice*. Copies of that rare work still appear from time to time among the treasures of second-hand bookshops at prices ranging from £5 to £16.

Among the interesting novelties in the realm of political ideas that have recently made their way onto our shelves are studies of Oriental systems of thought, specially fascinating as being so markedly different from all Occidental systems. And with these may be classed studies of Occidental systems by Oriental observers, equally interesting because of the novelty of their point of view. Among these two groups of works may be particularly noted *Political Pluralism*, by K. C. Hsiao (1927); *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism*, by L. S. Hsü (1931);

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Chinese Political Thought, by E. D. Thomas (1928); *The Problem of Federalism*, by Sobei Mogi (1931), and *Law and Life According to Hebrew Thought*, by J. Yahuda (1932).

The words "Pluralism" and "Federalism" in the above titles indicate, what is in fact the case, that among the leading problems discussed by advanced political thinkers in both this country and abroad is the problem of sovereignty, and particularly State-Sovereignty. While in dictatorial countries, where the "totalitarian" State is established, the omnipotence and omniscience of the State are loudly proclaimed and emphatically enforced against all rivals, whether Churches, trade unions, or commercial corporations; in democratic States the authority of the Government, already weak enough, is challenged by all sorts of voluntary associations, or by subordinate political units which claim autonomy by natural right. The logic of events is likely to re-enforce the arguments of Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Bentham, and Austin, and make short work of those systems which in search of liberty result in anarchy.

One more feature of recent speculation may be noted. It is the tendency to cease to treat political philosophy as a separate subject, but

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to merge it in a large and comprehensive science of sociology. Whether this merger will conduce to clarity or confusion remains to be seen. But, at any rate, sociology is too large a subject to be discussed here and now.

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PLATO : The Republic.

ARISTOTLE : Politics.

POLYBIUS : History of Rome.

CICERO : The Laws ; The Republic.

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